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Products Liability and Economic
Activity: An Empirical Analysis of
Tort Reform's Impact on Businesses,
Employment, and Production
JoannaM. Shepherd

66 Vand. L. Rev. 257 (2013)

For decades, advocates of tort reform have argued that
expansive products liability stifles economic activity by
imposing excessive and unpredictable liability costs on
businesses. Although politicians aspiringto create jobs, attract
businesses, and improve the economy have relied on this
argument to enact hundreds of reforms, it has largely gone
empirically untested. No longer. Using the most comprehensive
dataset to date on products liability reforms and economic
activity, I find that many reforms that restrict the scope of
products liability improve economic conditions. Specifically,
these reforms increase the number of businesses, employment,
and production in the industries that face most of the products
liability claims: the manufacturing, retail, distribution,
wholesale, and insurance industries. However, several other
popular reforms have either a weak effect or no effect on
economic activity. My results have important implications for
recently enacted reforms and proposed legislation: while many
of these reforms will improve economic conditions as
lawmakers hope, others will have no effect. In the current
economy, as business groups intensify their demands for tort
reform, my findings provide critical evidence for courts and
legislatures that are reassessing the appropriate scope of
products liability.
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INTRODUCTION

The optimal scope of products liability law has incited
vehement political debate for at least half a century. Proponents of
expanding products liability argue that consumers are not sufficiently
protected from dangerous products and that victims are not
adequately compensated for injuries from products.' In contrast,
supporters of reforms that reduce the scope of products liability
contend that excessive litigation has driven countless American
companies out of business and prevented innumerable socially
valuable products from coming to market. 2 In the states, the reformers
have won numerous victories as legislatures continue to enact reforms
1.
See, e.g., Dangerous and Defective Products, AM. ASS'N FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2012, 3:02
PM), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/9493.htm.
2.
See, e.g., Product Liability Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N (Sept., 15, 2012, 3:14 PM),

http://www.atra.org/node/56.
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that reduce the scope of products liability. Although they have been
less successful in persuading the U.S. Congress to enact
comprehensive products liability reforms, the reformers have
prevailed in pushing through various federal reforms that limit
products liability in specific industries.3
The primary argument among the proponents of reform is that
expansive products liability stifles economic activity by imposing
excessive and unpredictable liability costs on businesses. Although
politicians aspiring to create jobs, attract businesses, and improve the
economy have relied on this argument to enact hundreds of reforms, it
has largely gone empirically untested. Specifically, we know
surprisingly little about whether products liability law suppresses
economic activity, and which, if any, reforms might improve economic
conditions.4

This Article provides empirical evidence that addresses this
argument. This issue is particularly salient because economic
conditions are worse than they have been in decades, yet the cost of
the products liability system continues to grow. Consequently,
probusiness groups have intensified their demands for tort reform,
maintaining that reforms are essential to improving the economy.
Hence, it is imperative for lawmakers to know which reforms can help
mend current economic conditions. Moreover, the tort system costs
American businesses over $150 billion annually. 5 If reforms can
reduce this burden and ignite economic activity, they may help replace
some of the 8.8 million jobs lost in the current recession. 6
Part I describes how the scope of products liability law has
tended to ebb and flow over time. Prior to the mid-twentieth-century,
products liability cases were rarely brought and plaintiffs rarely won
the cases that were brought. However, sensing that the law was not
3.
For example, the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2,
108 Stat. 1552, 1553 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)), created an eighteen-year
statute of repose for manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and their component parts.
Similarly, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-06 (2006), limits
the products liability of biomaterials suppliers of raw materials and medical implant component
parts. Likewise, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 304, 863, 116 Stat.
2135, 2165, 2239 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 443 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2006)), limits the
liability of both manufacturers and administrators of the smallpox vaccine and sellers of
antiterrorism technology.
4.
AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 2.
TOWERS WATSON, 2010 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 7 (2010), available at
5.
http://www.towerswatson.com/united-states/research/3424.

6.

Paul Wiseman, U.S. Economic Recovery Is Weakest Since World War II, HUFFINGTON

2012),
(Aug.
15,
POST
weak n_1783065.html.

http//www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/0815/us-economic-recovery-
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achieving fair compensation and adequate deterrence, courts and
legislatures adopted strict products liability in the 1960s and further
expanded the law in the 1970s with the development of new
proplaintiff theories. Soon after, the business community declared a
"crisis," citing an explosion of lawsuits, excessive awards, and
skyrocketing insurance premiums. The community's activism was
extensive, ranging from nationwide advertising campaigns to
testimony before both Congress and state legislatures. It demanded,
and often achieved, the passage of countless state laws in the 1980s
and 1990s that were designed to curb the products liability crisis by
limiting liability and damages. This probusiness trend has continued
into the twenty-first century with states continuing to adopt new
reforms and Congress enacting legislation that dramatically reduces
the scope of products liability in specific industries.7
The impetus for most major expansions and contractions in the
scope of products liability law has been shifting assessments of the
law's costs and benefits. In Part II, I outline the primary benefits and
costs of the products liability system. The benefits of the system are
well accepted: compensation of victims, improvements in product
safety, and reduction in the purchases of risky products. However,
over the last few decades, increases in insurance coverage, consumers'
access to product information, and the reach of governmental safety
regulations have severely undermined these benefits. At the same
time, the costs of the products liability system-disproportionate
transaction costs, price distortions that deter socially beneficial
purchases, and reductions in economic activity-have been
exacerbated by increasing litigation expenses. Consequently,
contemporary reformers argue that, for many products, the costs of
the products liability system outweigh the benefits, necessitating a
change in the law. 8
Central to the reformers' demands for legal change is their
assertion that expansive products liability stifles economic activity. 9
Although this claim has been at the forefront of policy debates for
decades, there is a dearth of empirical evidence exploring this
relationship. My empirical analysis in Part III fills that void. Using
the most accurate, comprehensive dataset available on state-level
products liability tort reforms and measures of economic activity, I
7.
See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW §§ 1.2-1.3 (2005) (examining
products liability law in the United States).
8.
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1472-76 (2010).
9.
AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 2.
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analyze the relationship between the scope of products liability law
and several measures of economic activity: the number of small
businesses, employment, and gross state product (the state-level
counterpart of GDP). The state tort reforms included in my analysis
restrict the scope of products liability by limiting damage awards or
making future liability more predictable. The substantial differences
among states' choices of reforms and timing of enactment provide fifty
distinct "laboratories" that offer the ideal empirical setting both to test
the relationship between products liability law and economic activity
and to draw conclusions about the likely impact of federal tort reform.
Moreover, expansions in products liability law would be expected to
have the opposite effect on economic activity as the tort reforms
included in my analysis do.
Until recently, data limitations and conventional econometric
techniques prevented a precise analysis of the relationship between
products liability law and economic activity. There has never been a
comprehensive dataset of state-level tort reforms. However, the
Congressional Research Service has recently compiled a unique
dataset of products liability reforms that was subsequently made
available to researchers.10 This is the first study to employ this
dataset in an empirical analysis.
Moreover, conventional econometric techniques hindered
precise measurement of the relationship between products liability
and economic activity. A traditional difference-in-differences analysis
would have difficulty ruling out the possibility that products liability
reforms are endogenous to-that is, caused by-other factors that
influence business activity in a particular state, such as a powerful
probusiness lobby. However, I employ a sophisticated tripledifferences methodology that uses businesses in low-risk industries as
a control group to mitigate the endogeneity concerns."
My empirical results indicate that several reforms that restrict
the scope of products liability have a significant impact on economic
activity. Statutes of repose that limit the time period for which
manufacturers are liable for product defects, comparative negligence
reforms that reduce damage awards when plaintiffs engage in
negligent activity, and reforms that eliminate strict liability for
nonmanufacturer product sellers are all associated with statistically
10. HENRY COHEN, CONo. RESEARCH SERV., RL32560, SELECTED PRODUCTS LIABIlIY
ISSUES: A FIFIY-STATE SURVEY 8-23 (2005), available at http://stuff.mit.edulafs/sipb.
mit.edulcontrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL32560.pdf.
11. The triple-differences methodology was introduced by Jonathan Gruber. Jonathan
Gruber, The Incidence of MandatedMaternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622, 627 (1994).
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significant increases in economic activity. Specifically, my results
suggest that these reforms increase the number of businesses,
employment, and production in the industries that bear most of the
products liability claims: the manufacturing, retail, distribution,
wholesale, and insurance industries.
In contrast, other reforms have a weak effect on economic
activity. My results suggest that caps on noneconomic damages and
reforms to the traditional collateral source rule are only weakly
associated with increases in economic activity. Meanwhile, caps on
punitive damages and reforms eliminating joint and several liability
are weakly associated with decreases in certain measures of economic
activity.
My results have important implications for recently enacted
reforms and proposed legislation. In recent years, several states have
enacted reforms that reduce the scope of products liability law. My
results suggest that, while many of these reforms will improve
economic conditions, others will have no effect. Likewise, recently
proposed federal legislation contains some reforms that should
increase economic activity, whereas other proposed reforms will do
little or nothing to improve economic conditions.
As courts and legislatures reassess the appropriate scope of
products liability law, they will no longer have to blindly accept
reformers' assertions that reforms categorically improve economic
conditions. Instead, the results of my study indicate that, while some
products liability reforms can be important tools to improve economic
conditions, others will have no effect on economic activity.
I.THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTS LIABIITY LAW
Products liability law as we know it began in the 1960s. Prior
to that period, products liability cases were rarely brought and
plaintiffs rarely won the cases that were brought. 12 However, the
widespread adoption of strict liability in the 1960s and the
development of new proplaintiff theories in the 1970s expanded
products liability law and increased plaintiffs' recoveries. The tide
turned again in the early 1980s with the enactment of state-level
legislation that limited the scope of products liability law. This
prodefendant trend continued into the twenty-first century with
several industry-specific reforms adopted at the federal level. In this
12.
law).

See generally OWEN, supra note 7, § 1.3 (describing modern American products liability
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Part, I briefly describe the ebb and flow of U.S. products liability law
from its roots in English common law to the present.
A. Early American Law
The early development of products liability law was greatly
impeded by two powerful doctrines borrowed from England: caveat
emptor and privity of contract.' 3 Caveat emptor translates to "let the
buyer beware." Under this doctrine, sellers were not responsible for
product defects and buyers bore the risk for product-related injuries.
Hence, plaintiffs had no recourse under the law for injuries they
sustained from either obvious or hidden defects. Reflecting the
nation's commitment toward free enterprise and protecting infant
industries during the Industrial Revolution,14 all states but South
Carolina strictly adhered to the caveat emptor doctrine until the turn
of the nineteenth century.15 Caveat emptor persisted in the majority of
jurisdictions until the Uniform Sales Act of 1906 obligated an implied
warranty of quality that made sellers responsible for many product
defects.16

Despite legislatures imposing implied warranties of quality
after 1906, manufacturers often were still able to avoid liability with
privity defenses. The doctrine of privity required manufacturers and
consumers to be in a contractual relationship for a valid products
liability claim to lie. Thus, it comported with the realities of the
13. On the early history of products liability law in England and America, see Francis H.
Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligationsin the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L. REG. 273, 337 (1905);
Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Karl N.
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936); Karl N.
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1937); Cornelius F.
Murphy, Jr., Medieval Theory and Products Liability, 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 29 (1961);
William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of MerchantableQuality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943);
John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP. U. L REV.
335 (1984).
14. As explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, if a manufacturer of a boiler,
machine, or steam-ship "owes a duty to the whole world" that its products contain no hidden
defects, "it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent man would
engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities
to the parties immediately concerned." Curtin v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 245 (Pa. 1891).
15. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 961
(2007).
16. Promulgated in 1906, the Uniform Sales Act (predecessor to Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code) provided for an implied warranty of merchantability in sales by description:
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality. UNIF. SALES ACT § 15(2), 1 U.L.A 7 (1950), superseded by
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1962).
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preindustrialization economy when products were typically sold
directly by the manufacturer to the consumer.17 However, as
industrialization and mass production expanded, goods were
increasingly sold through intermediate retailers. As a result,
manufacturers no longer entered into contractual relationships with
consumers, and they could use the ready-made defense of no privity of
contract to avoid liability in products liability cases.' 8
As manufacturers became increasingly remote from consumers
in the expanding economy, the harshness of the privity doctrine
became obvious. The privity requirement began disappearing from
products liability claims in 1916, when the New York Court of Appeals
decided MacPherson v. Buick Motors.19 Explaining the liberation of
tort law from contracts, Judge Cardozo proclaimed:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We
have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the
law. 20

Although most states quickly followed New York's lead in eliminating
the privity requirement, it remained in a few states well into the
second half of the twentieth century. 21
As the majority of states eliminated the doctrines of caveat
emptor and privity of contract in the early 1900s, products liability
claims began to increase across the nation. 22 However, plaintiffs still
had to overcome significant hurdles to prevail in these cases. Because
negligence was the basis for products liability claims, the injured
party had to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in producing
the product and that the negligence caused the subsequent injuries.
Plaintiffs rarely prevailed in these cases because they were usually
unable to produce evidence of manufacturers' negligence, which often
occurred years before the product caused an injury. 23

17. Frances E. Zolers, Sandra N. Hurd & Peter Shears, Looking Backward, Looking
Forward:Reflections on Twenty Years of Products Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019,
1021 (2000).
18. Id.
19. 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916).
20. Id. at 1053.
21. Owen, supra note 15, at 966.
22. Id.
23. Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1022.
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B. Modern American Law
The tide began to turn in favor of plaintiffs in the early 1940s.
In the first, 1941 edition of the most influential treatise ever published
on tort law, Dean William Prosser argued for strict liability for
manufacturers of defective products. 24 Three years later, in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, the Supreme Court of California
upheld a res ipsa loquitur verdict against Coca Cola for an exploding
bottle, eliminating the need for plaintiffs to provide evidence of
manufacturers' negligence in situations where accidents would not
normally occur without negligence. 25 Moreover, in his concurrence,
Justice Roger Traynor argued for strict products liability using many
of Prosser's arguments: "[I]t should now be recognized that a
manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." 26
However, it was not until 1963 that strict products liability was
adopted by the Supreme Court of California. In Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., the court upheld a judgment for a plaintiff that
had been injured by a defective power tool. 27 Although Justice
Traynor had alone argued for strict liability in his concurrence in
Escola nineteen years earlier, he authored the majority opinion for a
unanimous court in Greenman: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."28
Just two years later, in 1965, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts helped propagate strict products liability to virtually every
jurisdiction. 29 The American Law Institute ("ALI") had started
revisions on the Restatement of Torts chapter that applied negligence
to the liability of sellers in the 1950s. 30 Fortuitously, Dean Prosser
was chosen as the Reporter for the Second Restatement.
Consequently, a year after Greenman was decided in his home state of
California, Prosser presented the ALI with a revised draft that
incorporated the principles of strict products liability found in both
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 688-93 (1941).
150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
377 P.2d 897, 901-02 (Cal. 1963).
Id. at 900.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Owen, supra note 7, § 5.3.
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Greenman and his own torts treatise. The American Law Institute
adopted the revision in 1965 as section 402A of the Restatement.3 1
Section 402A made products liability "strict" because sellers could be
liable even if they had exercised "all possible care" and thus were not
negligent. 32
From 1965 to the early 1980s, court after court, along with
several state legislatures, adopted strict liability for manufacturers
and sellers of defective products. The development of new theories,
such as enterprise 33 and market-share liability, 3 4 further facilitated
suits by consumer-plaintiffs. The end result was a body of products
liability law in 1980 that was significantly more plaintiff friendly than
it had been in the days when negligence was the basis for liability and
caveat emptor and privity of contract were valid defenses.
C. The Liability "Crisis"
Largely as a result of the proliferation of strict products
liability, products liability trials and awards increased significantly
beginning in the 1970s. Although only data on federal cases are
available during this period, the data reveal that products liability
cases increased by an average of forty percent per year during this
period.35 Whereas only 2,393 products liability cases commenced in
federal court in 1975, the number of these cases had increased to
31.

This section reads:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29.

32. Id. § 402A cmt. m. This point is made in black letter: "The rule stated in Subsection (1)
applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product.. . ."Id. § 402A(2).
33. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937-38 (Cal. 1980).
35. W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis,20 J. LEGAL STUD. 147,
150 (1991).
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14,145 by 1987.36 Moreover, this number drastically underestimates
the true number of products liability claims because many tort claims
are brought in state courtS37 and the vast majority are settled before
trial. 38
Furthermore, although litigation in general increased during
this time, products liability litigation increased at a significantly
higher rate. In 1975, products liability cases represented 2.04 percent
of all civil cases. However, by 1987, that share had almost tripled,
rising to 5.92 percent. 39
Awards in products liability cases increased as well. The
average verdict of $563,438 in 1980 more than doubled by 1987, to
$1,325,443.40 Similarly, the median verdict, which may be more
informative because it is not influenced by a few unusually large
awards, increased from $225,000 in 1980 to $430,000 in 1987.41
Increases in both the number of products liability cases and the
awards in those cases increased the expected liability for
manufacturers, distributors, and product sellers. As a result,
insurance companies increased the premiums for liability coverage for
these industries. When section 402A was published in 1965, total
liability premiums in the United States were $881 million. 42 By 1987,
this figure had increased by over two thousand percent, to $20.9
billion. The average annual growth rate during this period was over
sixteen percent, and in some years, premiums grew by over seventy
percent. 43
D. A Period of Reform
Although the causes of the explosion in premiums are
debatable, 44 there is little doubt that the more consumer-friendly
36. Id.
37.
CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JURY CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES: CIVILJUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 (1995).

38.

Viscusi, supra note 35, at 150.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 152.

41. Id.
42. MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUsI, PRODUCT LIABILITY ENTERING THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE 11-12 (2001).
43. Id.

44. Explanations involve the role of the underwriting cycle, conspiracy among insurance
companies, increased liability actions, and uncertainty. For an assessment of alternate
explanations of the crisis, see, for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability
Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-
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products liability law was at least partly to blame. 45 As a result,
manufacturers, insurers, and other businesses declared the situation a
"crisis" and pushed for legislation, either at the state or federal level,
to protect the interests of manufacturers and businesses. 46 Their
activism was extensive, ranging from industry papers47 to nationwide
advertising campaignS 48 to testimony before both Congress and state
legislatures.49

The proponents of immediate reform argued that proconsumer
products liability doctrines resulted in unfair harassment of
businesses by opportunistic consumers and plaintiffs' lawyers.50 They
claimed that burdensome liability costs and insurance rates had
dramatically increased the cost of doing business and were forcing
many manufacturers and sellers out of business.5 1 Moreover, they
argued that state-by-state variation in products liability laws resulted
in a competitive disadvantage for businesses operating in highliability states. 52 Thus, the arguments were generally cast in terms of
restoring balance to an area of law that had become lopsided in favor
of plaintiffs.53
The outcry in the business community won over some courts.
Although courts did not commonly overturn prior decisions, they
Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the
Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 929 (1987); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability
Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
45.

Viscusi, supra note 35. at 154.

46.

William P. Bivins, Jr., The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposalsfor Legislative

Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 595, 595 (1977).
47. See, e.g., MACH. & ALLIED PRODS. INST., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A MAPI SURVEY (1976),

reprinted in Product Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 95th Cong. 146-68 (1977); NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus.,
NFIB SURVEY REPORT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1977); John J. Kircher, Products Liability - The
Defense Position, 44 INS. COUNs. J. 276, 276 (1977) (discussing a tort reform position paper,
called the "Products Liability Position Paper," co-sponsored by The Defense Research Institute).

48.

See Anita Johnson, Products Liability "Reform'" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L

REV. 677, 678 nn.5 & 7 (1978) (referencing advertisements by manufacturers found in various
newspapers and magazines, such as THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, NEWSWEEK, TIME MAGAZINE,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, and THE WASHINGTON POST).

49. See Swine Flu Immunization Program:SupplementalHearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 84-85
(1976) [hereinafter Swine Flu Immunization Program] (statement of Leslie Cheek, Vice
President, American Insurance Association).
50. Johnson, supranote 48, at 678.
51.
See Swine Flu Immunization Program,supra note 49, at 85 ("Men have lost their jobs
and their businesses because of the passion of the judicial system to compensate an injured
person by attaching liability, however remote the justification.").
Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1023.
52.
53. Id. at 1024.
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regularly rejected arguments to further expand products liability
boundaries. 54 Moreover, many courts began to question whether strict
liability was the appropriate standard for evaluating a product's
warnings and design.55 The Restatement (Third) of Torts, published in
1998,56 eventually validated this doubt and grounded liability for
design and warning defects in the principles of negligence.57
However, a more significant attack on products liability law
came during the 1980s from state legislative bodies enacting tort
reform. The state legislatures were persuaded that products liability
reforms would solve the liability and insurance crisis and fix an
imbalanced system. 58 Moreover, they believed that reforming the
system would improve their local state economies: a more businessfriendly legal environment would bring business to their states,
creating jobs and strengthening the state economy. 59 State after state
enacted legislation designed to curb the crisis by limiting the scope of
liability and damages. Next, I discuss the most significant reforms
that the states adopted to limit the scope of products liability.
1. Statutes of Repose
One of the most frequent reform measures passed by the states
limits the period during which suits can be brought. 60 All civil suits
are subject to a statute of limitations. However, the statute of
54. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier:The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 1263, 1272 (1991).
55. See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550, 552-60 (Cal. 1991)
(discussing a case involving asbestos); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 376, 380-90 (N.J.
1984). But see Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Cal. 1996) (holding that "strict
liability" defective warning claims are still viable in that state, even if controlled by the principle
that manufacturers need warn only of "foreseeable risks").
56. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY, often referred to as the
Products Liability Restatement, was approved by the ALI's membership in 1997 and published
the following year.
57. Owen, supra note 15, at 988-89.
58. Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1032-40.
59. For example, Governor George W. Bush of Texas claimed that one of the most
important things government can do to improve the economy and create jobs in Texas was to
reform the civil justice system. Encouraging Entrepreneurshipand Economic Growth, GEORGE
W. BUSH OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (2000), http://web.archive.orgweb/20000531132207/http://www.

governor.state.tx.us/Business/tort.html. Similarly, Texas Representative Rob Junell (D-San
Angelo) said of products liability reform: "This brings us back into the mainstream of the
American civil justice system, and makes Texas a preferable place to do business . . . ." Ross
Ramsey, The 74th Legislature: 'This Is It," Lawsuit Reform on Way; Final Touches Are Being Put
on Bills, HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 1995, at 1.

60. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV.
602, 608 (1983).
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limitations for most torts is only one or two years. 61 Because the act
for which defendant manufacturers are traditionally liable is
manufacturing defective products, a two-year statute of limitations
poses a problem for plaintiffs injured by products purchased several
years earlier. Thus, rather than leave plaintiffs without a remedy
when they were injured by products purchased years earlier, many
courts adopted a "discovery" rule. 62 Under a discovery rule, the statute
of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff actually discovers the
injury, instead of when the defective product was purchased.63
However, under the discovery rule, manufacturers' exposure to
liability can last for the life of the product. Consequently, some
manufacturers are subject to liability for injuries caused by products
that are twenty and thirty years old. 64 To counteract this open-ended
liability, many states have adopted so-called statutes of repose that
specify the number of years after a product is first sold within which
suit must be filed.65 Instead of beginning to run when the injury is
discovered, the repose period begins to run when the product is first
marketed. Thus, a statute of repose may expire, precluding a lawsuit,
even before an injury occurs and a statute of limitations begins to run.
Most repose periods are set at ten years; 66 thus, suits for injuries
caused by products purchased over ten years earlier are barred under
statutes of repose. Twenty-seven states have adopted these reforms
that significantly reduce manufacturers' exposure to liability.6 7
2.

Reforms to Product-Seller Liability

Another popular reform adopted by the states involves the
liability of nonmanufacturer product sellers such as wholesalers,
distributors, and retailers. Under traditional products liability laws,
nonmanufacturer product sellers can be held strictly liable like
product manufacturers for injuries caused by product defects.
61.

WILUAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 'ITRTS § 30, at 143-45 (4th ed. 1971).

62. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637
F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1980); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580
S.W.2d 497, 498, 500-02 (Ky. 1979).
63. COHEN, supra note 10, at 16.
64. See, e.g., Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1974) (discussing
liability for injuries caused by a 24-year-old tractor); Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d
675, 676-79 (3d Cir. 1972) (discussing liability for injuries caused by a 30-year-old pickling
machine).
65. Dworkin, supra note 60, at 609.
66. Id. at 610.
67. COHEN, supranote 10, at 20-23.
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Although innocent sellers can subsequently recover from
manufacturers under traditional law, this creates significant
transaction and litigation costs. 6 8 Thus, several states have enacted
reforms that eliminate strict liability for wholesalers, distributors, and
retailers that do not manufacture products. Under these reforms,
nonmanufacturer sellers may be held liable only for their own
negligence or breach of warranty.69 Thus, these reforms relieve
nonmanufacturer sellers from the significant costs associated with
defending products liability claims. 70 Twenty-two states have enacted
reforms that eliminate strict liability for product sellers.71
3. Reforms to Joint and Several Liability
Several states have also reformed joint and several liability
rules in products liability cases. Under traditional joint and several
liability, a plaintiff can recover the full cost of her injury from any
party who is partially responsible for the injury, no matter how small
the party's responsibility. 72 The rule ensures that plaintiffs are fully
compensated, but ignores whether each codefendant pays his or her
portion of the damages. 73 As recently as 1973, joint and several
liability was universally applied in every state. 74
Unfortunately, traditional joint and several liability rules
encourage plaintiffs to seek out a "deep-pocket" defendant, even if that
defendant contributed only modestly to causing the damages.75
Although the deep-pocket defendant can seek contribution from the
other tortfeasors for their share of the damages, such cross claims are
often fruitless when the other tortfeasors lack resources. Reformers
argue that the traditional rule unfairly requires a single defendant to
pay the entire damage award, even when that defendant is only
remotely responsible for the harm.76 As a result, thirty-one states have
68.
69.
70.

Dworkin, supra note 60, at 616.
Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1033.
Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform in 1997:

History and Public Pblicy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L REV. 595, 608 (1997).
71.
72.

COHEN, supra note 10, at 1.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 47, at 327 (5th ed. 1984).

73.
74.

Id.
Paul Bargren, Comment, Joint and Several Liability: Protection for Plaintiffs, 1994

Wis. L. REV. 453, 471.
75. Id. at 456.

76.

See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational

Response to the Critics,22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1989) (complaining that shifting losses
to a joint tortfeasor treats the tortfeasor as a "whipping boy").
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eliminated joint and several liability in products liability cases so that
each responsible defendant is liable only in proportion to its relative
share of responsibility. 7
4. Reforms to the Collateral Source Rule
Other states have modified the traditional collateral source
rule. The traditional rule prevents the admission of evidence at trial
that shows that a plaintiffs losses have been compensated by other
sources, such as insurance or workers' compensation. The rationale for
the traditional rule is that a defendant should not benefit from
something paid for in advance by the plaintiff.7 8
Although the rule promotes efficient deterrence by requiring a
tortfeasor to pay damages even when a victim has received payments
from a source other than the tortfeasor, it allows plaintiffs to
potentially recover twice for the same injury.79 Moreover, even if
providers of the collateral benefit have a contractual or statutory right
to subrogation-allowing them to recover the value of the benefit from
successful tort claimants-subrogation involves significant transaction
costs to determine the providers' rights.80
Thus, several states have adopted reforms that include
allowing evidence of collateral source payments or completely
offsetting awards by the amount of collateral source payments.81
Thirty-six states have adopted such reforms that modify the
traditional collateral source rule in products liability cases.
5. Noneconomic Damage Caps
Limitations on damages have been passed by many states as
an additional way to treat the products liability crisis. Most reforms
are aimed at either noneconomic damages or punitive damages.
Noneconomic damages are damages for nonpecuniary losses such as

77.
78.

COHEN, supra note 10, at 13.
See O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Ky. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979); Michael Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral
Source Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 39, 43 (1990).
79. Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational Limit on Tort Law, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POLY 421, 427 (1999).
80. The amount of payment is subject to negotiation. See Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 465 P.2d 65, 67-68 (Cal. 1980).
81. See generally Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th),
(Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 184, Sept. 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=902711.
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pain and suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and other
intangible losses. Thus, unlike punitive damages, noneconomic
damages are compensatory, even though they are frequently difficult
to compute. Moreover, noneconomic damages serve an important
deterrent function because they make potential tortfeasors internalize
the nonpecuniary harms they impose on others. 82
However, critics claim that these damages are often excessive
and unpredictable, increasing both the level and variation of expected
liability costs. For example, one study suggests that the severity of
harm explains only about forty percent of the variation in
noneconomic damage awards in personal injury cases. This leaves
enormous award variation that is random and unexplained. For
example, awards for the most serious permanent injuries range in
value from approximately $147,000 to $18.1 million.83 This
unpredictability produces several harms. It makes settlement more
difficult because accurate prediction of jury awards is impossible.84 It
increases insurance premiums as insurers charge potential tortfeasors
"ambiguity premiums" to cover the increased risk.85 Moreover, the risk
of significant noneconomic damage payments may result in
manufacturers curbing innovation or production to reduce their
exposure to catastrophic judgments. 86
In addition, critics claim that, because prices reflect expected
liability costs, a tort system that provides noneconomic damages
effectively requires everyone in society to pay for insurance to cover
82. See Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If [pain and suffering]
were not recoverable in damages, the cost of negligence would be less to the tortfeasors and there
would be more negligence, more accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence higher social
costs.').
83. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 922-23 (1989); see also Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on
Pain and Suffering. A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 777 (1995) (asserting that there is substantial variability in jury
awards for pain and suffering for injuries of equal severity); David W. Leebron, Final Moments:
Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 288-325 (1989)
(analyzing pain-and-suffering awards in 256 wrongful death cases and concluding that there is a
lack of horizontal equity in awards).
84. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 406-08 (Denise Clinton ed.,
4th ed. 2004).
85. Howard Kunreuther & Robin M. Hogarth, How Does Ambiguity Affect Insurance
Decisions?, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 307, 321 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992)
("A principal conclusion emerging from surveys of actuaries and underwriters is that they will
add an ambiguity premium in pricing a given risk whenever there is uncertainty regarding
either the probability or losses.'.
86. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On Determining the Optimal Magnitude and Length of
Liability in Torts, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 554 n.7 (1984).
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such losses. Critics argue that most people do not want this
mandatory insurance for nonpecuniary losses because they do not
purchase insurance coverage for other nonpecuniary harms.87
State legislatures have listened to the critics, and twenty-four
states have adopted caps on noneconomic damages in products
liability cases. However, the reforms vary tremendously.88 Not only do
the amounts of the cap differ by state, but some reforms impose a
fixed dollar cap while others are indexed to inflation. Some reforms
impose different caps for different types of defendants or different
severities of injury. The reforms also vary in what kinds of cases are
covered or excluded from the cap.
6. Punitive Damage Caps
Punitive damages are meant to deter willful, wanton, and
malicious conduct. Although they are not awarded to compensate
victims, punitive damages may be necessary to achieve adequate
deterrence of either especially egregious behaviors or behaviors where
the probability of detecting negligence is low. 89 When victims only
discover their harms and/or file claims in a fraction of suits, damages
in the few suits that are filed must exceed the compensatory level to
achieve adequate deterrence.
However, critics argue that increasing punitive damage awards
have led to excessive litigation and windfall gains for plaintiffs.90 They
insist that the grounds for punitive damage awards are
87. For example, most people do not buy life insurance for the loss of a child to compensate
them for one of the most significant nonpecuniary harms imaginable. John E. Calfee & Paul H.
Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371,
378 (1992); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 392
(1989) ("[A] rational person would insure only against that pain and suffering that curtailed
earnings."); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1346-47, 1352 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform- A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988).
88. See Avraham, supra note 81.
89. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 84, at 371-76.
90. The American Tort Reform Association offered this analysis:
The difficulty of predicting whether punitive damages will be awarded by a jury in
any particular case, and the marked trend toward astronomically large amounts when
they are awarded, have seriously distorted settlement and litigation processes and
have led to wildly inconsistent outcomes in similar cases. . . .While punitive damages
awards are infrequent, their frequency and size have grown greatly in recent years.
More importantly, they are routinely asked for today in civil lawsuits.
Punitive Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, httpJ/www.atra.org/issues/punitivedamages-reform (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). But see Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law:
The RepublicanAttack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673,
758-59 (1996) (concluding that punitive damages are not out of control).
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inappropriately expanding in many areas. 91 Moreover, probusiness
groups argue that excessive and arbitrary punitive damage awards
have increased the cost and reduced the availability of insurance. 92
Many blame punitive damages for producing unjustifiably large
awards and forcing otherwise viable industries out of business. 93 Many
state legislatures have been persuaded that business competitiveness
depends on reasonable and predictable liability costs. 94 As a result,
twenty-three states have adopted caps on punitive damages in
products liability cases. 95
7. Comparative Negligence
Other states have reformed laws regarding comparative fault.
Historically, in an action claiming negligence on the part of the
defendant, contributory negligence disallowed any recovery by a
plaintiff whose own negligence contributed, even minimally, to
causing the damages. 96 In contrast, contributory negligence was not
recognized as a defense to strict liability. 97
Critics argue that contributory negligence is overly harsh to
negligent plaintiffs in negligence actions. As a result, forty-six states
have adopted comparative negligence that reduces the plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to his percentage of responsibility.98
91.
For a discussion of the expansion of punitive damage awards, see Dworkin, supra note
60, at 614-15.
92.
See, e.g., TORT POLICY WORKING GRP., REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 16, 35-42, 66-69 (1986) (detailing how the "[e]xplosive
[g]rowth in [tort] [d]amage [aiwards" likely contributed to a shortage of low-cost insurance;
recommending instituting a $100,000 cap on non-economic damages).
See, e.g., Dickinson R. Debevoise, Senior Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of
93.
N.J., Arthur T. Vanderbilt Lecture at Harvard Law School: A Trial Judge's View of Tort Reform,
in 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 853, 857-58 (1994) (noting anecdotal evidence that health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) suffer large punitive damage awards).
94.
Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A Proposed
Alternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 195-96 (1994).
COHEN, supranote 10, at 8-13.
95.
96. See, e.g., FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORYOF CIVIL LITIGATION: POUTICAL AND ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 38 (2011) ("A layman might assume incorrectly that once the product is
determined to be defective, the case is over. Before 1978, the rule was that if plaintiffs were
negligent to any degree, they could not recover.").
97. Id. at 38-39.
98. COHEN, supra note 10, at 5-8. Only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia
retain contributory negligence. Id. During my sample period, Ohio and Indiana also still used
contributory negligence. IND. CODE §§ 34-51-2-5 to -6 (West 2012) (enacted in 1998); COHEN,
supra note 10, at 5-8 (stating the Ohio contributory negligence statute was repealed in April
2003).
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Although these comparative negligence reforms were intended
to increase recovery for negligent plaintiffs, they have accomplished
the exact opposite in strict liability actions. Whereas contributory
negligence was not a defense to strict liability, comparative negligence
is recognized as a defense in these actions.99 Hence, in products
liability cases under contributory negligence, defendants' damages are
never reduced to reflect plaintiffs' negligence, but under comparative
negligence, defendants' damages are routinely reduced to account for
plaintiffs' negligence.
8. Other State-Level Reforms
States have experimented with other reforms to varying
degrees. Although the specific reforms vary by state, they all serve to
limit manufacturers' liability. For example, "The patent danger rule
relieves a manufacturer from liability for failure to warn or to
redesign if the dangerous aspect of the product is obvious to the
reasonable person."100 Although adopted by a few states,101 many have
rejected the rule as a complete defense and, instead, consider an
obvious danger as one factor to consider when determining liability. 102
Another reform adopted by some states relates to the "state of
the art," or the feasibility of safety measures when a product was
developed. These reforms have taken various forms, though most
allow the introduction of evidence about the state of the art at the
time the product was developed.103
9. Federal Reforms
In response to the perceived liability crisis of the 1970s and
1980s, numerous federal tort reform bills were also introduced in
99.

See, e.g., VANDALL, supra note 96, at 38-39 ("Historically, contributory negligence was

not recognized as a defense to strict liability . . . . The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was

drafted in 1977, and contemporaneously several state supreme courts have applied comparative
fault in strict liability actions.").
100. Dworkin, supra note 60, at 611.
101. See id. at 611-12 (noting that eighteen of thirty-five states to consider the patent
danger rule have refused to apply it as a complete defense).
102. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387
(1976) (applying a "reasonable care" standard where the "openness and obviousness" of danger is
a factor defense can raise against plaintiff but is not dispositive); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (explaining that a product's obvious danger is a
factor in determining a plaintiff's contributory negligence).
103. Cf. Micallef, 39 N.Y.2d at 386-87 (explaining that reasonable care is partially
determined by whether a manufacturer "kept abreast of recent scientific developments").
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Congress.104 The vast majority of these bills stalled in committee,
faced filibusters, or passed in one chamber but not the other. 05 As a
result, for years states were the primary source of legislative efforts to
reduce the scope of products liability. 106
However, in the 1990s, Congress successfully enacted a series
of products liability reforms that shielded manufacturers and product
sellers in specific industries. For example, the General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994 created an eighteen-year statute of repose
for manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and their component
parts.107 Similarly, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998
limits the products liability of biomaterials suppliers of raw materials
and medical-implant component parts. 108 Likewise, the Y2K Act
provides liability relief and limits on punitive damages for defendants
in legal actions arising from year-2000 computer failures. 09 The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 limits the liability of both
manufacturers and administrators of the smallpox vaccine and sellers
of antiterrorism technology.11 0 Similarly, the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act shields manufacturers, distributors, dealers,
and importers of firearms or ammunition from liability resulting from
the misuse of their products by others."'
Despite reformers' success at enacting various industry-specific
reforms, efforts to adopt comprehensive federal tort reform have
failed. Although numerous bills that reduce the scope of products
104. See Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1023-24 (explaining that Congress
responded to "perceived chaos" in tort law by enacting "bill after bill" to limit plaintiffs' recovery).
105. Id. at 1024-25.
106. Congress did enact legislation that protected defendants in certain industries while
providing substitute remedies for injured parties. For example, under the Swine Flu Act of 1976,
the Federal Government assumed liability for any injury in connection with the swine flu
vaccine, thereby shielding manufacturers and distributors of the vaccine from such liability.
National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (amended
1978). Similarly, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 substituted liability against
vaccine manufacturers with a federal no-fault compensation program funded by a tax on each
dose of vaccine. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 to -34 (2006) (establishing "the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program... under which compensation may be paid for a vaccine -related injury
or death').
107. See Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 152 (setting time limits on civil actions against
aircraft and aircraft component manufacturers).
108. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-06 (2006).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (2006).
110. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 304, 863, 116 Stat. 2135,
2165, 2239 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 443 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2006)) (making a civil action
against the United States the exclusive remedy for smallpox-vaccine-related-injuries; providing
the governmdnt contractor defense to antiterrorism technology vendors).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902-03.
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liability across all industries have been proposed in Congress, they
have yet to be enacted. The bills are often successful in one chamber
but fail in the other. One bill was even passed by both chambers, but
Congress subsequently failed to override President Clinton's veto of
the bill.112 Proponents of federal tort reform argue that, despite state
tort reforms, many judgments are still excessive. In addition, they
argue that national uniformity in products liability law is necessary to
prevent distortions in the cost of doing business across states.113
Comprehensive federal tort reforms continue to be proposed every few
years, and several powerful business interest groups continue to
campaign for them.114
II. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
The historical ebb and flow in the scope of products liability

law has been caused by shifting assessments of the law's costs and
benefits. Early expansions were the result of courts and policymakers
sensing that the law was not achieving fair compensation and
adequate deterrence. Later contractions ensued when courts and
legislatures feared that products liability law had gone too far and was
stifling economic activity.
In this Section, I outline the primary benefits and costs of the
U.S. products liability system. I also explain how recent developments
have dramatically changed the relevance of various benefits and costs.
Increases in the availability of insurance, consumers' access to product
information, governmental safety regulations, and litigation costs
have altered the relative magnitudes of products liability law's

benefits and costs.116

112. For an account of President Clinton's veto of the Common Sense Product Liability and
Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995), see Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes
Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al (quoting the President saying that the bill
"tilts the playing field against consumers" and "inappropriately intrudes on state authority").
113. See Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1023 ("Businesses . . . argued that the
lack of uniformity that resulted from the state-by-state development of the common law [of strict
products liability] created an unfair burden, requiring them to manufacture to the most costly
state requirements at the expense of competitiveness.").
114. Gary Wilson et al., The Future of Products Liability in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 85, 93-94 (2000).
115. For a more thorough discussion of the costs and benefits of the products liability
system, see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1437. For a different perspective, see John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L REV. 1919, 1919 (2010).
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A. Benefits of Products Liability Law
Assertions about the benefits of the products liability system,
and the tort system in general, have been the impetus for most
historical expansions in tort law. Next, I describe the three primary
benefits of the products liability system: compensation of victims,
improvements in product safety, and reduction in purchases of risky
products.
1. Compensation of Victims
One of the primary functions of tort law is compensation.
Similarly, products liability law is designed to compensate consumers
for harm resulting from defective products and to restore them to their
preinjury conditions." 6 Because manufacturers and product sellers
can spread the cost of compensation over an array of products, they
are in a better position to bear the compensatory burden than
consumers.
The products liability system played an essential role in
reimbursing tort victims during much of the twentieth century.
However, widespread insurance coverage, subrogation provisions, and
increasing litigation expenses and delays combine to undermine the
compensatory function of modern-day products liability law.117
During much of the twentieth century, the products liability
system was essential for reimbursing tort victims' injury-related costs
because there were few other sources for victims to look to for
compensation. However, as more and more Americans obtain
insurance that covers many injury-related costs, the products liability
system is no longer the principal source of compensation.' 18 In the
116. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 26-27 (2d ed. 2011)
("Compensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort law. Payment of
compensation to injured persons is desirable. If a person has been wronged by a defendant, it is
just that the defendant make compensation. Compensation is also socially desirable, for
otherwise the uncompensated injured persons will represent further costs and problems for
society.'); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV.
39, 45 (1994) ("The commonly understood goal of tort compensation is to restore the injured to
their preaccident condition, to make them whole.'); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis":
A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L REV. 765, 769 (1987)
("[I]njured plaintiffs should receive an amount necessary to make them'whole,' that is, to restore
them to the position they would have occupied but for the defendant's tortious conduct.').
117. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1464-65. But see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
115, at 1934-40 (arguing that compensatory damages still improve tort victim's welfare despite
high legal costs and subrogation).
118. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1462-63 ("[T]he influence of product liability
on compensation is incremental, only beyond that furnished by insurance.").
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United States, approximately ninety-seven percent of homeowners
have property insurance,119 eighty-five percent of the population has
health insurance,120 about seventy-eight percent of families own life
insurance,121 and at least thirty-three percent of the workforce has
disability coverage.122 These various forms of insurance reimburse tort
victims for all or many injury-related costs, often negating the need for
the products liability system to compensate victims. Indeed, many tort
victims with adequate insurance coverage never even file tort
claims,123 suggesting that compensation from litigation would often be
redundant and unnecessary.
Moreover, increases in the frequency of subrogation provisions
in insurance contracts reduce the compensation that tort victims
receive from the products liability system.124 Subrogation provisions
give insurers the right to "stand in the shoes" of the insured victim
and assert a claim against the defendant for any expenses that the
insurance company paid to the victim.125 Because these provisions
reimburse the insurer for its payment to the insured out of any
judgment or settlement, consumer victims often retain only a portion
of the settlements and judgments from products liability claims.1 26
119. Homeowners and Renters Insurance: Expenditures for Homeowners and Renters
Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., httpJ/www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/homeowners (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012) (citing 2011 survey).
120. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 21 fig.7 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf (showing that 15.3% of the population has no
health insurance).
121. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2008, at 61 (2008),
available at http://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%2Facts/Life%2Insurers%2Fact%2Book/
Documents/e4f672e3748844ce8a434412bd8Olc2dFactBook2009.pdf (citing 2004 data).
122. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 2715, NATIONAL
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2008 tbl. 12 (2008),
available at httpJ/www.bls.gov/ncsebsfbenefits/2008/ebbl0041.pdf (finding thirty-five percent of
workers participate in short-term disability insurance and thirty-one percent participate in longterm disability insurance).
123. See, e.g., HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 41 (1990); see also

PAUL C. WEILER ET AL, A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 61-76 (1993) (relaying survey results showing that a
significant number of medical malpractice victims never file tort claims).
124. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1463-64 (using a hypothetical to explain how
subrogation policies allow insurers to retain a portion of tort victims' damage awards).
125. Id. at 1464.
126. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 405-07 (4th ed. 2005)
(outlining legal and policy questions arising from insurers' ability to recoup costs from insured
parties' tort settlements and judgments through equitable and contractual subrogation); Alan 0.
Sykes, Subrogationand Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383, 383-85 (2001) (noting how insurers
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Finally, increasing litigation costs and delays undermine the
compensatory function of the products liability system.127 Several
studies have found that, because of rising legal fees, tort victims
generally retain only forty-six cents of every dollar paid by defendants
in tort litigation. 128 Moreover, increasing litigation delays effectively
reduce compensation as inflationary pressures reduce the value of
damage awards.129 As a result, the products liability system has
become increasingly ineffective at compensating tort victims for
product-related injuries.
2. Improvements in Product Safety
Another primary function of tort law is to incentivize potential
tortfeasors to take precautions and avoid risky behavior.130 Because
products liability law makes product sellers pay for harm caused by
defective products, it gives them a financial incentive to reduce or
may often recover portions of tort judgments regardless of whether the tortfeasor's assets
sufficiently cover the cost of the victim's injuries).
127. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1464-65.
128. See e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS

AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION, at ix tbl.S.3, x (1986), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R3391.pdf C'[After litigation costs], the injured plaintiff
receives approximately 56 percent in net compensation.... If we add the value of time spent by
the litigants to the costs, the injured parties' net compensation sinks to 46 percent of the total
expenditures."); TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003),
available at https://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2003_Tort_Costs_
Update/TortCostsTrends_2003_Update.pdf (showing that victims receive twenty-two cents for
economic losses and twenty-four cents for noneconomic losses). Subsequent reports do not state
the amount obtained by plaintiffs per dollar spent by defendants. See, e.g., TOWERS PERRIN, 2008
UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 1-19 (2008), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/
getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/2008112008_tortscoststrends.pdf (no per plaintiff award
numbers).
129. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1465 ("[I]f victims do not receive interest on
their judgment or settlement from the time of the accident until receipt of their payment, then
they will be shortchanged.").
130. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 18 (4d ed.
2012) ("The imposition of tort liability . .. helps to prevent future tortious actions, by threatening
potential wrongdoers with liability if they cause actionable harm."); PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 424 (7th ed. 2006) ("One of the most important of the
suggested functions of personal injuries compensation law is deterrence of potentially injurycausing conduct .

..

."); Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 808 (1990)

("At least since Learned Hand offered his famous formula ... judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
have argued that fear of liability will compel potential tortfeasors to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis, taking just those safety precautions that cost less than the accidents they prevent.");
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 131 (1993)
("[Deterrence] remains an important goal of tort law in the eyes of those judges and lawyers who
maintain that the threat of tort liability acts as an incentive for persons engaged in various
activities to take steps to reduce the risk of injuries." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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eliminate product risks. As a result, product sellers should take more
care in the design, manufacture, and marketing of products.
However, the contribution of products liability law to
improving product safety has declined over time with increases in
consumers' access to product information and expansions in
governmental safety regulations. Market forces provide a significant
incentive for many manufacturers to improve product safety.131 There
are numerous examples of consumers abandoning their purchases of
products once the products are found to be unsafe. 132 Similarly,
consumer demand often increases in response to favorable safety
information. 33 However, the market's ability to punish and reward
product sellers depends on consumers obtaining information about
product safety. For much of the twentieth century, consumers had
limited access to product-safety information. In contrast, recent
technological advances have broadened the reach of the media,
enabled extensive product research, and opened communication
channels that allow consumers to exchange product information. As a
result, product-safety information is more accessible than ever before,
increasing the ability of the market to discipline product sellers. In
turn, the role of the products liability system in improving product
safety has declined. Indeed, empirical results suggest that products
liability law has a smaller impact on product safety when consumers
are well informed about product risks. For example, one study of the
relationship between products liability law and accidental fatalities in

131. For a thorough discussion of the role of market forces on product safety, see Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 8, at 1443-50.
132.

See,

e.g.,

RICHARD

N.L.

ANDREWS,

MANAGING

THE

ENVIRONMENT,

MANAGING

OURSELVES 213-14 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing that cranberry purchases declined after consumers
became aware that a potentially toxic pesticide was used on some cranberries); GARY DAVIES ET
AL., CORPORATE REPUTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 110-11 (2003) (discussing that sales of
Perrier dropped after consumers became aware of benzene contamination); RONALD D. MICIMAN
& EDWARD M. MAZZE, THE FOOD INDUSTRY WARS 140-41 (1998) (discussing that sales of Gerber
declined after glass was found in some containers of Gerber peaches); Tamar Lewin, Tylenol
Posts an Apparent Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1982, at 30 (noting that Tylenol lost eightyseven percent of its market share when several people ingested Tylenol capsules contaminated
with cyanide); Bradley A Stertz, U.S. Study Blames Drivers for Sudden Acceleration, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 2, 1989 (discussing that Audi purchases dropped due to consumer fears that the cars
were prone to sudden acceleration).
133. See, e.g., William Boulding & Devavrat Purohit, The Price of Safety, 23 J. CONSUMER
RES. 12, 24 tbl.B1 (1996) (concluding that Volvo is able to charge a premium for its cars due to
their safety reputation); Austin Weber, Cirrus Soars with Composites, ASSEMBLY, Aug. 29, 2008,
at 26, available at http://www.assemblymag.com/articles/85800-cirrus-soars-with-composites
(noting that the Cirrus SR22 is the "world's best-selling aircraft," largely because of its safety
reputation).
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the home concludes that products liability law increases care levels
only when consumers are poorly informed about risk. 134
In addition, the expansion of governmental safety regulations
has reduced products liability law's contribution to improving product
safety. 135 Whereas the government had little to say about product
safety during the early twentieth century, government agencies now
regulate
the safety
of countless
products. Automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, aircraft, and numerous consumer products are
subject to extensive safety regulations. 136 Evidence confirms that
many of these government regulations have drastically improved
product safety.137 Moreover, because government regulations of some
products, such as drug labels 138 and medical devices, 139 may preempt
products liability claims, products liability law has no way of
providing incentives to improve product safety. Hence, for many
products, products liability law may not improve safety beyond the
level already required by government regulations.
Thus, significant increases in consumers' access to information
and expanding governmental safety regulations both reduce the role of
the products liability system in improving product safety.140 Empirical
studies attempting to measure this role have produced mixed results.
Most interviews with manufacturers and corporate executives
suggest that products liability law strongly influences decisions about
product design, 141 research and development devoted to product

134. See Richard S. Higgins, Producers'Liabilityand Product-RelatedAccidents, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 299, 318 (1978) ("[The evidence consistently shows that producer liability at best has a
negative impact on the home accident rate when the education attainment level is low.").
135. For a thorough discussion of the role of regulation on product safety, see Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 8, at 1450-53.
136. Id.

137. See e.g., Lloyd D. Orr, The Effectiveness of Automobile Safety Regulation: Evidence from
74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1384, 1387 (1984) (calculating that as many as 9,200
the FARS lta,
lives were saved by automobile safety regulations); Success Stories Index, U.S. CONSUMER
PRODUCTS SAFETY COMMISSION, httpJ/www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/success/index-html (revised
May 5, 1996) (highlighting examples of the impact on product safety of regulations on cigarette
lighters, cribs, hair dryers, and bicycles).
138. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (summary judgment
granted on FDA's implied preemption of plaintiffs warning claims regarding anti-depressant
Paxil and risk of suicide).
139. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
140. But see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 115, at 1928-33.
141. GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS:
CORPORATE REPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION viii (1983).
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safety,142 and other safety improvements.14 3 In contrast, a considerable
body of empirical work suggests that the liability system does not have
a significant effect on product safety. For example, several studies
explore the relationship between products liability law and aggregate
accident rates. One finds that an increase in products liability
litigation has no effect on either aggregate death rates or the rate of
product-related injuries requiring emergency room treatment.144 My
own previous study of accidental-death rates finds that general tort
reforms that reduce manufacturers' incentives to improve product
safety do not result in an increase in accidental-death rates.1 45
Other studies investigate the influence of products liability law
in specific industries. For example, an early study analyzing motor
vehicle safety finds that the scope of products liability law had no
impact on passenger car-death rates between 1950 and 1988.146 Other
studies explore the influence of products liability law on the safety of
general aviation aircraft. The studies all report that the expansion of
liability for aircraft manufacturers during the 1970s and 1980s had no
impact on the rate of fatal aviation accidents.147 Another study
exploring the safety of vaccines finds that increases in the liability
risk faced by vaccine manufacturers in the 1970s and 1980s had no
influence on vaccine safety.148

142. Egon Zehnder Intl, The Litigious Society: Is it Hampering Creativity, Innovation, and
Our Ability to Compete?, 2 CORP. ISSUES MONITOR 1, 2 (1987), available at http://legacy.library
.ucsf.edu/tid/sff22d00/pdf.
143. E. PATRICK McGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 20 tbl.32 (1988); NATHAN
WEBER, THE CONFERENCE BD., REPORT NO. 8732, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE
RESPONSE 15 chart 3 (1987).

144. George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABIUTY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 193-94 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (showing
that despite "an enormous expansion of products liability," product safety studies "provide no
evidence that the expansion of litigation has affected the injury or death rate").
145. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 221, 235 (2007).

146. See John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120, 180-83 (Peter W. Huber
& Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).

147. Andrew Craig, Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 146, at 456, 476;

Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing:An Industry Under Siege, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 146, at 478, 49293.

148. Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1994).
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3. Reduction in Purchases of Risky Products
Products liability may also benefit consumers by reducing
socially undesirable purchases of risky products that result when
misinformed consumers underestimate product risks.149 When
consumers underestimate product risks they, in turn, undervalue the
true costs of products and may make socially undesirable purchases by
purchasing products with costs that exceed the value to consumers.
As products liability law increases the expected litigation costs
of selling risky products, manufacturers, in turn, pass on much of the
expected costs to consumers in the form of higher prices.150 As the
prices of risky products increase, these products are disadvantaged in
the market. Consumers that are unaware of product risks will,
nevertheless, demand fewer products as the prices increase. As a
result, the price-signaling function of products liability will lead to less
informed consumers purchasing fewer products.' 5 '
However, the degree to which higher prices reduce socially
undesirable purchases of risky products depends on how misinformed
consumers are about product safety. If well-informed consumers
already incorporate product risks into their estimates of the true costs
of products, price increases will do less to correct the miscalculations
of products' true costs that result in socially undesirable purchases.
Thus, the price-signaling benefit of products liability law has declined
as modern-day consumers grow better informed about product
safety.152
Moreover, as I discuss in the next Section, when prices increase
to incorporate not only expected liability costs but also significant
expected litigation costs, then excessive price increases will deter
socially beneficial purchases.153
B. Costs of ProductsLiability Law
Legal scholars and policymakers also recognize that the
products liability system produces significant costs. Next, I describe
the three primary costs of the system: excessive transaction costs,
149. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1461-62.
150. Guido Calabresi refers to this as the "general deterrence" or "market method" objective.
GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 27 (1970).
151. Products liability can also correct consumers' overestimation of product risks.
Ultimately, when prices reflect product risks, products liability will lead to more efficient
purchases of risky products. Polinsky & Shavell, supranote 8, at 1459-62.
152. See, e.g., id. at 1460.
153. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.

286

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 66:1:257

price distortions that deter socially beneficial purchases,
reductions in economic activity.

and

1. Excessive Transaction Costs
The U.S. tort system has become an increasingly inefficient
way to transfer money from injurers to victims. The transaction costs
of the tort system-measured as the sum of legal, administrative, and
third-party expenses, but excluding damage awards to victimstotaled $248.1 billion in 2009, or $808 per citizen. 154 In contrast, the
transaction costs of the system in 1960 totaled only $5.4 billion, or,
when adjusted for inflation, $218 per citizen.155 This nearly fourfold
increase in the transaction costs of the tort system is the direct result
of the increasing costs of legal representation15 6 and litigation
delays.157

As the transaction costs of the tort system increase, the portion
of the defendants' payments retained by plaintiffs decreases. Several
studies have found that tort victims generally receive only forty-six
cents of every dollar paid by defendants in tort litigation. 58 Other
studies that examine products liability cases report that victims in
these cases receive between thirty-seven and fifty cents of every dollar
spent by defendants, depending on the product.159 Hence, for every
dollar defendants pay to compensate victims, an additional dollar and
change is spent on legal and administrative expenses. Moreover, as

154. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 5, at 6.
155. Id.

156. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing
Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 655 n.5 (2003) (noting that during the
1960-2001 period, inflation-adjusted hourly rates of tort plaintiffs' lawyers have increased as
much as 1400%).

157. See e.g., George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court CongestionProblem, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 527, 532 (1989) (showing that civil court suit-to-trial delays average 4.71 years).
158. See e.g., KAKAUK & PACE, supra note 128, at x; TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra
note 128, at 17 (showing that victims receive twenty-two cents for economic losses and twentyfour cents for noneconomic losses). Subsequent reports do not state the amount obtained by
plaintiffs per dollar spent by defendants. See e.g., TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 128.
159. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 104
(2005) (concluding that plaintiffs receive forty-two cents of every dollar paid by defendants in
asbestos cases); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
151 (1988) (concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in
medical practice cases and forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in products liability
cases); Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in lB HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 1339, 1369 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (concluding that
plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in medical practice cases).
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legal fees and litigation delays continue to increase, this inefficiency
will only worsen.
2. Deterrence of Socially Beneficial Purchases
High litigation costs may also deter socially beneficial
purchases. As manufacturers incorporate expected liability costs into
product prices, the prices will reflect more than just the compensation
paid to victims. As less than half of the money paid by defendants goes
to the compensation of victims, similarly, less than half of the price
increases will reflect compensation. High litigation and administrative
costs constitute the majority of the price increases. As a result,
increasing litigation costs will continue to increase prices, deterring
potentially socially beneficial transactions.1 6 0
Although price increases of unsafe products may benefit society
by reducing the consumption and use of such products, the products
liability system will cause price increases among socially valuable
products as well. For example, empirical studies show that there is a
strong relationship between expected liability costs and the prices of
both vaccines and prescription drugs. 161 Price increases among
medicines, vaccines, safety features on cars, and other risk-reducing
products will lead to fewer purchases of socially valuable products.
Ultimately, reductions in such worthwhile purchases will likely lead
to negative social consequences. Indeed, in my recent empirical study
of the relationship between tort reform and death rates, I found
evidence supporting the notion that higher liability costs among riskreducing products result in an increase in accidental deaths. 162
3. Reduction in Economic Activity
Expansions in the scope of liability reduce potential tortfeasors'
incentives to engage in activities that could potentially result in a
tort. 1 63 This is especially true in strict liability regimes where
tortfeasors are liable regardless of the level of care they exercise.
Hence, strict products liability reduces the incentives for product

160. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1470-72.
161. Manning, supra note 148, at 273; Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and

PrescriptionDrug Prices in Canada and the United States, 40 J.L & ECON. 203, 234 (1997).
162. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 145, at 235.
163. For a discussion of the tort system's influence on activity levels, see COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 84, at 332-33.
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sellers to design, manufacture, and sell products. 164 As a result,
expanding the scope of products liability should decrease economic
activity such as production, employment, innovation, and business
openings.
Several consequences of the products liability system may
deter economic activity. First, products liability directly influences
business decisions by increasing the expected liability costs associated
with the design, manufacturing, and marketing of products. In 2009,
the cost of torts alleged against businesses was $152.7 billion.165
Although some of these costs are passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices, the unpredictable and arbitrary nature of product
injuries and products liability cases means that ex ante price
increases cannot incorporate all liability costs that many
manufacturers will subsequently pay. Consequently, significant and
unpredictable liability costs will affect many important business
decisions including whether to open or close businesses, relocate to
lower-liability areas, and increase or decrease production.
In addition, products liability litigation leads to declines in
stock value that may deter business activity. Several empirical studies
have shown that litigation adversely affects the stock price of
businesses as the market incorporates the expected cost of future
litigation. For example, one recent study finds that media reports of
products liability litigation significantly decrease firms' stock
values. 166 Another study reports that litigation events significantly
reduce the value of firms in the automobile and pharmaceutical
industries. 167 Oftentimes, the reduced stock value costs the firm more
than the associated liability costs. As a result, fears of stock value
declines that result from litigation will likely influence owners'
important business decisions.
The products liability system also deters economic activity by
increasing the cost that product sellers must pay for general liability
insurance. Several empirical studies find that insurers charge higher
premiums to product sellers when expansions in products liability law

164. For a discussion of the activity-level effects of medical malpractice liability, see Joanna
Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels,
55 UCIA L. REV. 905, 924-29 (2008).
165. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 5, at 6.
166. W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, The Market Response to Product Safety Litigation, 2 J.
REG. ECON. 215, 228 (1990).
167. David W. Prince & Paul H. Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on the
Value of FIrms, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 44 (2002).
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increase either expected liability or legal uncertainty.168 Increases in
expected liability increase insurers' exposure, and greater legal
uncertainty increases the variance in the insurers' exposure, thereby
increasing the insurers' risk. As a result, insurers add an additional
cost, or "ambiguity premium," above the expected value of liability
when there is uncertainty in either the likelihood or magnitude of
liability. 169 Indeed, empirical studies have shown that greater legal
uncertainty is associated with higher premium rates.170 Higher
premium rates, in turn, increase the costs of doing business for
manufacturers and product sellers, deterring economic activity.
Thus, by increasing expected liability, reducing stock value,
and increasing insurance premiums, the products liability system
deters economic activity. These factors influence the incentives for
new businesses to open, existing businesses to close, businesses to
relocate, and businesses to expand or contract the production and
marketing of products.
Empirical studies confirm the influence of the products liability
system on certain types of business decisions. For example, several
studies have explored the influence of products liability law on
innovation. One study reports that interviews with senior-level
corporate executives reveal that litigation concerns deter many
companies from introducing new products.171 Other studies report that
interviews with risk managers and CEOs confirm that liability fears
lead many major corporations to discontinue existing product lines.1 72
Econometric studies also confirm the relationship between
products liability and innovation. The studies generally find that at
low levels of expected liability, businesses invest resources in safety

168. Patricia H. Born & W. Kip Viscusi, The Distributionof the Insurance Market Effects of
Tort Liability Reforms, in 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS
55, 55 (Clifford Winston et al. eds., 1999); W. Kip Viscusi, The Performance of Liability Insurance
in States with Different Products-LiabilityStatutes, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 809, 834 (1990); W. Kip
Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability and Medical
MalpracticeInsurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 166 (1993).
169. See Kunreuther & Hogarth, supra note 85, at 307, 321 ("A principal conclusion
emerging from surveys of actuaries and underwriters is that they will add an ambiguity
premium in pricing a given risk whenever there is uncertainty regarding either the probability
or losses."); George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and
Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 31 (1991).
170. W. Kip Viscusi, The Risky Business of InsurancePricing,7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 117,
136 (1993).
171. Egon Zehnder Intl, supra note 142, at 2.
172. MCGUIRE, supranote 143, at 2, 6 tbl.4; WEBER, supra note 143, at 15 chart 3.
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improvements.173 However, as expected liability increases, businesses
reduce new product introductions and spending on innovation. In
contrast, products liability reforms that reduce expected liability
would be expected to increase the introduction of new products.
Another study has explored the relationship between state tort
reforms and state productivity.17 4 Although it focused on general tort
reforms instead of products liability reforms, the study found that
cost-reducing reforms enacted between 1970 and 1990 were associated
with significant increases in productivity. 7 5
Thus, several empirical studies confirm that products liability
law affects certain business decisions, such as the decision to innovate.
In the next Part, I test whether products liability law affects business
decisions relating to important measures of economic activity: the
number of business establishments, employment, and production. My
findings provide critical evidence for courts and legislatures
reassessing the appropriate scope of products liability.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND ECONOviC ACTIVITY

To explore the relationship between products liability law and
economic activity, I empirically investigate the impact of the most
important state-level products liability reforms on states' economic
activity. These reforms all restrict the scope of products liability by
limiting damage awards or making future liability more predictable.
The substantial differences among states' choices of reforms and
timing of enactment provide fifty distinct "laboratories" that offer the
ideal empirical setting both to test the relationship between products
liability law and economic activity and to draw conclusions about the
likely impact of federal tort reform. Moreover, the results demonstrate
that expansions in products liability law would influence economic
activity in the opposite direction.
173. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product
Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION,
AND CONSUMER WELFARE 105, 123 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J.

Moore, An Industrial Profile of the Links Between Products Liability and Innovation, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABIUTY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 146, at
81, 114; W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and
Innovation, 101 J. POL ECON. 161, 182 (1993).

174. Thomas J. Campbell et al., The Link Between Liability Reforms and Productivity: Some
Empirical Evidence, in 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS,

supra note 168, at 107, 108-09.
175. Id. at 109.
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Although claims about the impact of products liability law on
economic activity have been at the forefront of all policy debates, there
is a dearth of empirical evidence exploring this relationship. Until
now, two challenges prevented a precise analysis of this relationship.
First, data limitations made the measurement of both products
liability law and economic activity extremely difficult. There has never
been a comprehensive dataset of state-level tort reforms available to
researchers. A comprehensive dataset of medical malpractice tort
reforms was finally created in 2006 thanks to an "army of research
assistants," an NSF grant of over $72,000, and years of work by a
tireless legal scholar. 176 Fortunately, the Congressional Research
Service has recently compiled a unique dataset of state products
liability reforms that was subsequently made available to
researchers. 77 In addition, the U.S. Census Bureau has significantly
expanded its collection and reporting of measures of economic activity
in recent years. This is the first study to employ these combined
datasets in an empirical analysis.
Second, conventional econometric techniques made precise
analysis of the relationship difficult. A traditional difference-indifferences analysis would have difficulty ruling out the possibility
that products liability reforms are endogenous, that is, caused by
other factors that influence business activity in a particular state,
such as a powerful probusiness lobby. However, I employ a
sophisticated triple-differences methodology that uses businesses in
low-risk industries as a control group to mitigate the endogeneity
concerns.178
First, I discuss the measurements of products liability law and
economic activity that I use in my analysis. Then I discuss the
methodology and empirical results.
A. Measures of ProductsLiability
My analysis will test the effects of many of the most common
tort reforms: reforms eliminating strict liability for nonmanufacturer
product sellers, reforms adopting comparative negligence, caps on
punitive damages, caps on noneconomic damages, reforms limiting
joint and several liability, reforms modifying the collateral source rule,
and reforms adopting statutes of repose. These reforms all limit the
176.
177.
178.
note 11,

Avraham, supra note 81.
COHEN, supra note 10, at 1.
The triple -differences methodology was introduced by Jonathan Gruber. Gruber, supra
at 627.
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scope of products liability law and reduce the liability costs of doing
business. Caps on punitive damages and caps on noneconomic
damages directly limit specific damage awards. Reforms eliminating
joint and several liability, reforms adopting comparative negligence,
and reforms modifying the collateral source rule reduce the damage
award imposed on a specific defendant by allocating responsibility or
compensation among different parties. Reforms eliminating strict
liability for nonmanufacturer product sellers reduce the liability of
sellers as they are held liable only for their own negligence or breach
of warranty. Finally, statutes of repose limit the period for which
manufacturers and product sellers are liable for product defects.
My analysis covers the period from 1977 to 1997. This period
encompasses the most significant state-level contraction of products
liability law in history. In 1977, after several federal reform measures
failed in Congress, reform advocates began to view the statehouses as
the only possible source of relief.' 79 Over the next twenty years, states
passed a multitude of reforms designed to limit businesses' liability.
Differences in the timing and selection of reforms among the fifty
states during this period provide ideal variation for an empirical
analysis. Moreover, my sample period ends in 1997, when the
enactment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and subsequent
reforms at the federal level reduced some of the variation among the
states.180 Hence the period from 1977 to 1997 allows me to exploit
state-level variation to empirically isolate the influence of products
liability law on economic activity.181 Table 1 reports the number of
states with each tort reform during these years.

179. Zollers, Hurd & Shears, supra note 17, at 1023-33.
180. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing federal reforms).
181. In addition, census data on business patterns changed in 1998, affecting the
comparability with later years.
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Table 1:
Number of States with Products Liability Tort Reforml 82
Year
78 79

80 81 82 83 84 85

Product Seller 4
Reforms

7

10 12

Comparative 17
Negligence

17 21

Reform

77

9

12 12 12 12

21

24 24 24 26 28

5

5

5

6

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

12 12 14 14 15

17 18 19 19 20 20 20

32 36 38 38 39 40 42 43 43 43 44 44

9

13 14 15 15

151

16 16 21 21 20

Punitive
Damage
Caps

4

4

5

5

5

Joint and
Several
Reform

9

11

12

12

12 12 12 13 14

Statutes of
Repose

9

16 18

19 21 21 20

Noneconomic 3
Damage
Caps

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

4

11

12 12 11

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

8

14 16 16 17 16 15 115 14 14 14

Collateral

19 17

21 23 24 25 25 25 27 27 27 28 28 28

18 18 18 18

18 18 18 18 18

19 19 19

10 10 10 10 10 11 11 10

Source
Reforms

B. Measures of Economic Activity
I examine the influence of products liability law on various
measures of state-level economic activity: the number of small
business establishments in high-risk industries, employment in these
establishments, and gross state product (the state-level equivalent of
GDP) in high-risk industries. I provide more detail on each measure
below.

182. Data on these reforms are from the Congressional Research Service, COHEN, supra note

10, The Database on State Tort Law Reforms, Avraham, supra note 81, and my research
assistants' searches of state codes and case law.
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1. Number of Small Business Establishments
My first measure of economic activity is the number of small
business establishments per one hundred thousand state residents in
high-risk industries. The number of business establishments is an
important measure of economic activity, reliably reflecting both the
economic conditions in an area and the economic changes over time. 183
Exploring the influence of products liability law on establishments
will determine how products liability law affects the cost of doing
business by measuring net changes in business openings and closings.
Moreover, it will determine whether tort reform advocates and
policymakers are correct in their assertions that state-level tort
reforms attract businesses to their states. 184
a. Small Businesses
I measure the economic activity of small business
establishments, or establishments with fewer than one hundred
employees. Businesses of this size are more likely to be affected by
state-level products liability laws than larger businesses for several
reasons. First, small businesses are less likely to sell to a national
market than larger businesses. 85 Large manufacturers and retailers
that distribute their products nationwide could be subject to the laws
in any state in which a consumer lives, and thus state-specific
products liability laws will have less impact on business decisions. In
contrast, small businesses selling locally are more likely to be subject
to the laws of the state in which they are located. Typically, the law
applied to any tort is the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which
the suit is brought; in most cases in which a product's acquisition, the
victim's domicile, and the victim's injury are in the same state, courts
apply the laws of that state. 86 Thus, state-specific products liability

183. County Business Patterns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/
index.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
184. For example, Texas Representative Rob Junell (D-San Angelo) said of products liability
reform: "This brings us back into the mainstream of the American civil justice system, and
makes Texas a preferable place to do business . . ." Ramsey, supranote 59.
185. Viscusi, supra note 168, at 813.
186. Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The 1990s and Beyond, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2004) ("[I]n 79% of the cases in which the product's acquisition and the
victim's domicile and injury were in the same state, the courts applied that state's law,
regardless of whether it favored the plaintiff or the defendant and regardless of whether that
state was also the forum.").
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laws should have a greater influence on small businesses that sell
locally than large businesses with national markets.
Second, small businesses are less likely to be part of a multiestablishment company, such as chain retailers. Businesses with
fewer than one hundred employees are much more likely to be singleestablishment companies. In 1998, at least ninety-five percent of
businesses with fewer than one hundred employees were singleestablishment businesses. In contrast, as few as eight percent of
businesses with more than one hundred employees were singleestablishment businesses.187 Whereas company-wide decisions and
policies of multi-establishment businesses will be influenced by the
laws of many states, the decisions of a single-establishment business
are more likely to be influenced by the law of the state in which it is
located. 188 That is, state-level products liability laws are more likely to
influence the business decisions for a small local hardware store than
for a Home Depot.
Third, examining the economic activity of small, singleestablishment
businesses
mitigates
endogeneity
concerns.
Endogeneity bias can result if a third, confounding variable is driving
changes in both products liability law and economic activity. For
example, perhaps the political clout of a dominant business in the
state is responsible for both the adoption of products liability reforms
(through lobbying efforts) and increases in economic activity (through
other probusiness efforts). However, small businesses are less likely to
be involved in the lobbying efforts that could make products liability
reforms endogenous to the forces that correlate with economic activity.
Whereas a large business, such as a General Motors manufacturing
plant, will have substantial political clout in a state and spend
significant resources lobbying for products liability reforms, small,

187. Statistics of U.S. Business: 1998, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/epcd/
susb/1998/us/US--.HTM (last modified July 13, 2011).
188. Nevertheless, confining my analysis to small businesses will not eliminate all of the
multi-establishment businesses or businesses selling to the national market. However,
inadvertently including these businesses will bias my results toward finding no impact of tort
reform on economic activity. That is, assuming that the products liability laws governing a
business are the laws in which the business is located, when in fact the business sells nationally,
will bias my results toward zero. This type of random measurement error will imply that the
actual effects of products liability reforms on economic activity are greater than those found in
my analysis.
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single-establishment businesses are less likely to have the same
influence on state lawmakers. 89
Finally, analyzing businesses at the individual establishment
level, rather than the firm level, will more accurately capture the
influence of state-level products liability laws on expected liability and
insurance premiums. 90 In the majority of products liability cases
involving businesses that sell locally, the substantive law applied in
the case is the law of the jurisdiction where the establishment is
located.191 As a result, insurance companies charge different
premiums based on the substantive law in the jurisdictions in which
the establishment is located, not the substantive law of the insured
firm's corporate headquarters.192 Thus, whereas state corporate law
may influence decisions about where to base corporate headquarters,
state products liability law will influence decisions about where to
locate individual establishments.
b. High-Risk Industries
I measure the relationship between products liability reforms
and the economic activity of high-risk industries, or industries bearing
the majority of products liability claims. 93 As businesses in these
industries face the most exposure to products liability litigation,
changes in products liability law will likely have the largest impact on
their business decisions.
I employ two different measures of high-risk industries. My
first measure includes only manufacturing industries. Products
liability law is designed to deter manufacturers from producing
defective products. Hence, changes in products liability law should
189. See Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, Firm-Level Determinantsof PoliticalInfluence,
22 ECON. & POL. 233 (2010) (showing empirically that larger firms have more political influence
on government policies).
190. Firms are an aggregation of all establishments owned by a parent company. In singleestablishment businesses, the firm and the establishment are the same. Statistics of U.S.
Businesses: Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, http://www.census.gov/econ/sush'definitions.html#
(last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
191. See Symeonides, supra note 186, at 1247.
192. See Viscusi, supra note 168, at 835 (describing the powerful effect that individual state
products liability law has on insurance premium levels).
193. I collected the data from the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns collection for
the years 1977-1997. These data include information on the number of business establishments
in each state and year, the industry of each establishment, and the employment size of each the
establishment. Data is arranged by the Standard Industrial Classification system, and is
aggregated at the Major Group (two digit SIC) level. Data was previously available from the
University of Virginia Geospatial & Statistical Data Center http//fisher.1ib.virginia.edu/
collections/stats/cbp, and is now on file with author.

2013]

PRODUCTS LIABILITYAND ECONOMICACTIVITY

297

alter manufacturers' cost of doing business and, in turn, influence
decisions about opening, closing, and relocating businesses.
My second measure of high-risk industries includes both
manufacturing industries and other industries whose businesses
regularly serve as defendants in products liability claims: the retail,
distribution, wholesale, and insurance industries. Under the common
law in most states, all sellers in the chain of distribution are strictly
liable for product defects.194 This includes wholesalers, distributors,
and retailers that had no role in the manufacture or design of a
product. Similarly, insurers are often involved in products liability
litigation. As businesses in these industries are subject to products
liability claims, changes in the scope of products liability should
influence their important business decisions.
Appendix 1 reports the industry groups defined as high-risk
industries in this analysis.
2. Employment
My second measure of economic activity is employment in
small business establishments per one hundred thousand state
residents in high-risk industries. 95 Although the number of business
establishments is an important measure of economic health, most
citizens and policymakers are more concerned about employment.
Exploring the impact of products liability law on employment will
determine the reach of the law's influence on economic activity. That
is, this measure will allow me to determine whether products liability
law's influence has trickled down from the business decisions of the
boardroom to the everyday lives of citizens. Moreover, it will
determine whether tort reformers are correct in their assertions that
restricting products liability creates jobs.196 In my analysis of
employment, I define small businesses and high-risk industries as I
did in my analysis of establishments.

194. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposalfor Change,
55 BAYLOR L REV. 1031, 1032-33 (2003).

195. The employment data come from the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns
collection for the years 1977-1997. Data is arranged by the Standard Industrial Classification
system, and is aggregated at the Major Group (two digit SIC) level. Univ. of Va. Geospatial and
Statistical Data Ctr., supra note 193.
196. For example, Governor George W. Bush of Texas claimed that one of the most
important things government can do to improve the economy and create jobs in Texas was to
reform the civil justice system. GEORGE W. BUSH OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 59.
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3. Gross State Product
My third measure of economic activity is real per capita
production, or gross state product, by high-risk industries in each
state. 197 Gross state product is the state-level counterpart to gross
domestic product, or GDP, which economists use to identify economic
recessions and expansions. Similarly, gross state product measures
the economic output of a state, and determines the health of a state's
economy. Hence, exploring the relationship between products liability
law and this measure will determine whether changes in businesses'
exposure to liability have altered the most common indicator of
economic health. In addition, this measure will determine the validity
of pro-reform claims that constricting products liability is good for the
economy.198 My definitions of small businesses and high-risk
industries remain the same as in my analysis of establishments and
employment.
C. Econometric Methodology
To test the relationship between the scope of products liability
law and economic activity I employ a sophisticated triple-differences
methodology. This methodology allows me to avoid many of the pitfalls
of a more traditional analysis that can result in misleading findings.
A traditional difference-in-differences analysis would examine
the influence of reforms on economic activity by measuring differences
in economic activity across states and years (two differences).
However, this methodology would have difficulty ruling out the
possibility that products liability reforms are endogenous to-that is,
caused by--other factors that influence economic activity in a
particular state. For example, it may be the case that a third variable,
called a confounding variable, such as a powerful probusiness lobby, is
responsible both for differences in economic activity across states or
years and for the enactment of products liability reform. An influential
probusiness lobby should be able to both push through products
liability reforms and generate other changes that improve the state's
economic activity. As a result, a traditional difference-in-differences
analysis could produce results suggesting that reforms increase
economic activity when, in fact, there is no causation. Instead, the
197. Data on real gross state product by industry were obtained from Regional Economic
Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/regionall (last modified Sept. 25,
2012).
198. Ramsey, supra note 59 and accompanying quote.
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results are picking up the influence of a probusiness lobby on both
reforms and economic activity.
To avoid these misleading results, I employ a triple-differences
methodology. Although still relatively new in the empirical literature,
this methodology has been successfully employed to mitigate
endogeniety bias in the presence of an important confounding variable
that could be driving the results in a difference-in-differences
estimation. 199 Specifically, a triple-differences estimation exploits
three differences to reliably isolate relationships between variables.
Whereas a difference-in-differences methodology measures differences
across states and years, a triple-difference methodology also measures
a third difference, in this case, differences across industries that are at
high risk and low risk for products liability claims.
Nearly all confounding variables that would create endogeneity
bias in a difference-in-differences estimation affect economic activity
among both high-risk and low-risk businesses. For example, potential
confounding variables such as a powerful probusiness lobby, favorable
corporate law, tax incentives for businesses, an abundant supply of
skilled labor, and many others, should influence economic activity
across all industries. There is no reason why these variables would
only affect economic activity in industries that face significant
products liability exposure. Consequently, measuring differences in
economic activity between high- and low-risk industries allows me to
net out, or control for all other factors that influence industries
regardless of risk. As a result, the triple-differences methodology
allows me to isolate the influence of products liability law from
thousands of other variables that might also influence economic
activity.
I define the low-risk industries as industries relatively immune
from products liability claims: water transportation, pipelines, mining,
communications, utilities, personal services, business services,
automobile-repair services, miscellaneous -repair services, motion
pictures, educational services, social services, museums, and
membership organizations. These low-risk industries serve as control
groups for the high-risk industries previously discussed: the
manufacturing, retail, distribution, wholesale, and insurance
industries. Appendix 2 discusses further empirical tests that confirm
the validity of my categorization of high-risk and low-risk industries.
My triple-differences model takes the following form:
199. The triple-differences methodology was first introduced in 1994. Gruber, supra note 11,
at 627.
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Economic Activityi.t= a + 8, industryi + 82 -state, + Ba*yeart + B4*(industryixstate.) +
85 *(industryixyeart) + Be (statexyear) +67- (high-risk industryixstate.xyeart) + eit
where i indexes industry, s indexes state, and t indexes year. 200 The

coefficient 81 measures the systematic differences among each
industry's economic activity across all states and years. With 82, I
measure persistent differences among states' levels of economic
activity. The coefficient 83 measures annual changes that affect the
economic activity across all states, such as economic recessions and
expansions. With fl4, I measure the systematic differences among each
state/industry combination across all years. That is, /34 captures
influences on each industry within a state that do not change over
time, such as the existence of certain natural resources or proximity to
important transportation sources. The coefficient 135 measures
systematic differences among each year/industry combination across
all states. That is, this coefficient controls for changes over time that
affect an industry regardless of state, such as technological changes or
federal regulations affecting specific industries. With , I control for
time-varying effects within each state that influence the economic
activity in all industries, such as a business-friendly environment,
favorable corporate law, wage levels, or tax incentives for business
owners.
The coefficient /37 isolates products liability law's influence on
(high-risk
variable
The
indicator
activity.
economic
a highonly
to
indicate
of
one
industryixstatesxyear) takes the value
risk industry in a state and year with a specific products liability
reform. It is zero otherwise. Thus, the coefficient f7 captures variation
in economic activity specific to high-risk industries (relative to lowrisk industries), in the reform states (relative to nonreform states), in
the years after products liability reforms have been enacted (relative
to before the reforms). All results tables report only the coefficient f7
for each estimation; the other variables are included in the analysis,
but not reported for brevity.
Moreover, all regressions are estimated with the appropriate
state population weights, and I present both robust standard errors
and standard errors clustered by state to mitigate concerns about
serial correlation. 201 In addition, I present a specification that adds

200. The natural log is used to remove the scale effects in the data due to differences in the
amount of establishments, employees, and output across the different industries.
201. Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECONOMIcs 249 (2004) (raising concerns
about serial correlation in difference-in-differences studies, and suggesting potential remedies).
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separate linear trends for each state and industry combination as a
robustness check.
D. Empirical Results
Tables 2 through 7 report results from the triple-differences
analyses of the relationship between products liability law and
economic activity. In each results table, the top number in each cell is
the regression coefficient, which indicates the magnitude and direction
of the relationship between each products liability reform and
economic activity. A negative coefficient indicates that products
liability reform is associated with decreases in economic activity. In
contrast, a positive coefficient indicates that products liability reform
is associated with increases in economic activity.
.In addition, the tables report robust standard errors in
parentheses and standard errors clustered by state in square
brackets. 202 In the table, * and + indicate significance at the five
percent and ten percent levels, respectively. 203
1. Business Establishments
Table 2 reports the results for the triple-differences analysis of
the relationship between products liability law and the number of
small business establishments in manufacturing industries. The other
control variables in the Model are included in the analysis, but are not
reported in the interest of brevity.

202. The standard error is a measure of the precision with which the regression coefficient is
measured. The size of the standard error relative to the coefficient indicates whether the result is
statistically significant. Specifically, the regression coefficient divided by the standard error
equals the t-statistic of the coefficient. Coefficients with t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.645
are considered statistically significant at the ten percent level, meaning that there is ninety
percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Similarly, t-statistics equal to or
greater than 1.96 indicate statistical significance at the more certain five percent level.
Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects
another in the direction indicated by the coefficient.
203. Each results table also reports R-squared statistics, which measure the regression's
overall goodness of fit. That is, the R-squared measures how much of the overall variation in the
dependent variable-here, the relevant economic activity-is explained by the explanatory
variables. Thus, the R-squared of a regression will vary between zero and one. An R-squared of
zero means that the explanatory variables explain none of the dependent variable's variation. An
R-squared of one means that the explanatory variables explain all of the variation. The closer the
R-squared is to one, the better the regression explains the data. See WILLIAM H. GREENE,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 33-34 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the use of R2 as a measure of goodness
of fit of a given regression line).
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TABLE 2: PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND SMALL BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENTS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 204

Without
State*Industry
Trends
0.006
Product-Seller
Liability

With
State*Industry
Trends
-0.019

(0.008)

(0.005)*

[0.026]

[0.015]

Comparative
Negligence

0.038
(0.009)*
[0.020]+

0.03
(0.006)*
[0.0121*

0.035
(0.009)*
[0.029]

-0.002

Punitive Damage
Caps
Joint and Several

-0.045
(0.010)*

-0.004
(0.009)
[0.013]

[0.0221*
0.018

Statute of Repose

(0.009)*
[0.010]+
-0.004

Noneconomic
Damage Caps
Collateral Source
Reform
Observations
R-squared

(0.010)

[0.026]
-0.014
(0.009)
[0.031]

(0.007)
[0.018]

0.014
(0.006)*
[0.08]+

0.025
(0.006)*
[0.015]+
0.022

38513

(0.007)*
[0.012]+
38513

0.9941

0.9951

204. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of business establishments in
each industry per one hundred thousand state residents. High-risk industries are defined as
manufacturing industries. Below the coefficients, robust standard errors are in parentheses and
standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets; * and + indicate significance at the five
percent and ten percent levels, respectively. All regressions are estimated with state population
weights and include industry*state, industry*year, and state*year effects.
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The results for manufacturing industries show that reforms
imposing comparative negligence and statutes of repose have a
consistent positive relationship with the number of small
manufacturing business establishments. These effects are statistically
significant with both robust standard errors, with standard errors
clustered by state, and when trends are added for each state and
industry combination.
The magnitudes of the coefficients imply that, 205 holding other
things constant, 206 reforms imposing comparative negligence are
associated with approximately a 3.05-3.87 percent increase in the
number of small manufacturing businesses. Similarly, statutes of
repose are associated with approximately a 1.41-1.82 percent increase
in the number of small manufacturing business
Results for other reforms are weaker. Both caps on
noneconomic damages and reforms to the collateral source rule have a
statistically significant positive relationship with the number of small
manufacturing businesses in two of the estimations, suggesting that
these reforms may also increase economic activity. Reforms to joint
and several liability have a statistically significant negative
relationship with the number of small businesses in two of the
estimations, implying that this reform may be associated with
decreases in economic activity.
Table 3 reports the results for the number of small business
establishments in industries that are regular defendants in products
liability cases: the manufacturing, retail, wholesale, distribution, and
insurance industries. Once again, the other control variables in the
Model are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the interest
of brevity.

205. In my semi-log estimation, the interpretation of the marginal effect of the coefficient is
[exp(87 ) - 11, so the percentage impact is 100[exp(fi7) - 1].
206. "Holding other things constant," or "ceteris paribus," means that if no other changes
except comparative negligence reforms had occurred during this period, there would have been a
3.0-3.8 percent increase in the number of small manufacturing business establishments.
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TABLE 3:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND SMALL BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENTS IN INDUSTRIES BEARING MOST OF THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CLAIMS 207

With
State*Industry
Trends
0.021
(0.004)*

Product-Seller

Without
State*Industry
Trends
0.017
(0.008)*

Liability

[0.01]+

[0.01]+

Comparative
Negligence

0.012
(0.008)
[0.011]

-0.002
(0.004)
[0.01]

Punitive Damage

0.026
(0.007)*

-0.011
(0.014)

Caps

[0.02]

[0.02]

Joint and Several

-0.022
(0.009)*
[0.002]+

0.015
(0.010)
[0.011]

0.021

0.015

(0.008)*

(0.004)*

[0.01]*

[0.009]

Noneconomic
Damage Caps

-0.004
(0.009)
[0.017]

0.024
(0.004)*
[0.01]+

Collateral Source
Reform
Observations
R-squared

-0.022
(0.014)
[0.017]
51365
0.9958

0.026
(0.004)*
[0.011*
51365
0.9965

Statute of Repose

207. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of business establishments in
each industry per one hundred thousand state residents. High-risk industries are defined as
manufacturing, retail, wholesale, distribution, and insurance industries. Below the coefficients,
robust standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors clustered by state are in square
brackets; * and + indicate significance at the five percent and ten percent levels, respectively. All
regressions are estimated with state population weights and include industry*state,
industry*year, and state*year effects.
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The results show that only reforms eliminating strict liability
for product sellers and statutes of repose have a consistent positive
relationship with the number of small businesses in industries
bearing most of the products liability claims. The magnitudes of the
coefficients indicate that, holding other things constant, reforms
eliminating strict liability for product sellers are associated with
approximately a 1.71-2.12 percent increase in the number of small
businesses in industries bearing most of the products liability claims
during my twenty-year sample period. Similarly, statutes of repose
are associated with approximately a 1.51-2.12 percent increase in the
number of small business establishments in these industries.
The results for other reforms are weaker. Both caps on
noneconomic damages and reforms to the collateral source rule have a
statistically significant positive relationship with the number of small
businesses in these industries in two of the estimations, suggesting
that these reforms may also increase economic activity. Reforms to
joint and several liability have a statistically significant negative
relationship with the number of small businesses in two of the
estimations, implying that this reform may be associated with
decreases in economic activity.
2. Employment
Tables 4 and 5 reveal the influence of products liability law on
small business employment in high-risk industries. Table 4 reports
the results for manufacturing industries. The other control variables
in the Model are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the
interest of brevity.
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TABLE 4:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES 208
With
Without
State*Industry State*Industry
Trends
Trends
0.066
-0.093
(0.047)
Product-Seller
(0.048)+
[0.075]
[0.096]
Liability
Comparative
Negligence

Punitive Damage
Caps
Joint and Several

Statute of Repose

Noneconomic
Damage Caps
Collateral Source
Reform
Observations
R-squared

-0.074
(0.047)
[0.070]

0.021
(0.046)
[0.048]

-0.118
(0.049)*

-0.124

[0.139]

[0.102]

-0.043
(0.051)

-0.047

[0.068]

[0.068]

0.228
(0.055)*

0.19
(0.060)*

[0.0881*

[0.070]*

-0.080
(0.059)

-0.088

[0.107]
0.030
(0.046)
[0.0671
38513

0.9001

(0.057)*

(0.070)

(0.056)
[0.125]

-0.048
(0.041)

[0.0721
38513
0.9084

208. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of employees in each industry
per one hundred thousand state residents. High-risk industries are defined as manufacturing
industries. Below the coefficients, robust standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors
clustered by state are in square brackets; * and + indicate significance at the five percent and ten
percent levels, respectively. All regressions are estimated with state population weights and
include industry*state, industry*year, and state*year effects.
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The Table reports that only statutes of repose have a
consistently significant relationship with manufacturing employment.
The results indicate that, holding other things constant, statutes of
repose are associated with approximately a 20.92-25.61 percent
increase in employment in manufacturing industries during the
sample period.
Caps on punitive damages have a weak negative relationship
with manufacturing employment in small businesses. The negative
relationship indicates that this reform is associated with decreases in
employment. However, the results are only statistically significant in
two of the four estimations.
Table 5 reports the results for employment in small businesses
in industries bearing most of the products liability claims. The other
control variables in the Model are not reported in the interest of
brevity.
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TABLE 5:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIES
BEARING MOST OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS 209

With
State*Industry
Trends
0.033
(0.014)*
[0.02]+

Product-Seller
Liability

Without
State*Industry
Trends
0.091
(0.039)*
[0.045]*

Comparative
Negligence

0.093
(0.040)*
[0.066]

-0.004
(0.030)
[0.036]

Punitive Damage
Caps

-0.096
(0.040)*
[0.098]

-0.087
(0.037)*
[0.063]

Joint and Several

0.059
(0.042)
[0.063]

-0.012
(0.044)
[0.050]

Statute of Repose

0.203
(0.044)*
[0.073]*

-0.025
(0.039)
[0.051]

Noneconomic
Damage Caps

-0.042
(0.049)
[0.088]

-0.055
(0.035)
[0.082]

Collateral Source
Reform
Observations
R-squared

0.009
(0.038)
[0.059]
51365
0.9086

-0.066
(0.026)
[0.050]
51365
0.9162

209. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of employees in each industry
per one hundred thousand state residents. High-risk industries are defined as manufacturing,
retail, wholesale, distribution, and insurance industries. Below the coefficients, robust standard
errors are in parentheses and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets; * and +
indicate significance at the five percent and ten percent levels, respectively. All regressions are
estimated with state population weights and include industry*state, industry*year, and
state*year effects.
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The Table reports that only reforms eliminating strict liability
for product sellers have a statistically significant positive relationship
with employment across all specifications. The coefficients suggest
that this reform is associated with a 3.36-9.53 percent increase in
employment in small business establishments during the twenty-year
sample period, holding other things constant.
The results also suggest that statutes of repose have a positive
effect on employment in two of the four specifications, suggesting that
this reform may also increase this measure of economic activity. In
contrast, punitive damage caps are associated with decreases in
employment in two of the four specifications, indicating a negative
relationship between this reform and employment in industries
bearing most of the products liability claims.
3. Gross State Product
Table 6 reveals the results for the triple-differences analysis of
the relationship between products liability law and gross state product
in manufacturing industries. The other control variables in the Model
are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the interest of
brevity.
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TABLE 6:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND GROSS STATE PRODUCT IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 2 10

With
State*Industry
Trends
-0.041
(0.011)*

Product-Seller

Without
State*Industry
Trends
0.015
(0.016)

Liability

[0.051]

[0.037]

0.031

0.030

Comparative
Negligence

(0.015)*
[0.011]*

(0.011)*
[0.017]+

Punitive Damage
Caps

0.022
(0.016)
[0.041]

0.027
(0.011)*
[0.034]

-0.055
(0.016)*
[0.031]+

0.022
(0.014)
[0.024]

0.017

0.02

(0.017)

(0.010)*

[0.037]

[0.039]

-0.023

0.018

(0.022)
[0.085]

(0.017)
[0.027]

0.014

0.074

(0.015)
[0.049]
35959
0.9809

(0.009)*
[0.016]*
35959
0.9898

Joint and Several

Statute of Repose

Noneconomic
Damage Caps
Collateral Source
Reform
Observations
R-squared

210. The dependent variable is the natural log of the real gross state product per capita in
each industry. High-risk industries are defined as manufacturing industries. Below the
coefficients, robust standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors clustered by state are
in square brackets; * and + indicate significance at the five percent and ten percent levels,
respectively. All regressions are estimated with state population weights and include
industry*state, industry*year, and state*year effects.
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The results show that only reforms adopting comparative
negligence have a consistently significant positive relationship with
manufacturing production. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest
that these reforms are associated with a 3.05-3.15 percent increase in
gross state product in manufacturing industries, holding other factors
constant. Reforms modifying the collateral source rule have a positive
effect in some specifications, though the inconsistency suggests the
effects are weak. Similarly, reforms to joint and several liability have
a weakly negative relationship with gross state product in
manufacturing industries.
Table 7 reports the results for gross state product in small
businesses in industries bearing most of the products liability claims.
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TABLE 7:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORMS AND GROSS STATE PRODUCT IN
INDUSTRIES BEARING MOST OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS 211

Without
State*Industry

With

Trends

Trends
0.041
(0.01)*
[0.035]

State*Industry

Product-Seller
Liability

0.018
(0.005)*
[0.01]+

Comparative
Negligence

0.029
(0.01)*
[0.03]

0.029
(0.01)*
[0.027]

Punitive Damage
Caps

0.022
(0.02)
[0.04]

0.028
(0.01)*
[0.032]

Joint and Several

-0.053
(0.02)*
[0.03]+

0.026
(0.022)
[0.027]

Statute of Repose

0.020
(0.016)
[0.03]

0.022
(0.009)*
[0.036]
0.016

Noneconomic

-0.020
(0.02)
[0.08]
0.012
(0.01)
[0.041
40159
0.9835

0.066
(0.008)*
[0.0171*
40159
0.9910

Damage Caps
Collateral Source
Reform
Observations

R-sauared

(0.013)

[0.025]

211. The dependent variable is the natural log of the real gross state product per capita in
each industry. High-risk industries are defined as the manufacturing, retail, distribution,
wholesale, and insurance industries. Below the coefficients, robust standard errors are in
parentheses and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets; * and + indicate
significance at the five percent and ten percent levels, respectively. All regressions are estimated
with state population weights and include industry*state, industry*year, and state*year effects.
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The results reveal that reforms eliminating strict liability for
product sellers are positively associated with gross state product in
the industries bearing most of the products liability claims in three of
the four specifications. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that
this reform is associated with a 1.82-4.19 percent increase in gross
state product in the high-risk industries during my sample period.
Reforms adopting comparative negligence and reforms to the
collateral source rule are also positively associated with production in
many of the specifications, whereas elimination of joint and several
liability is negatively associated with production in many of the
specifications.
4. Summary of Results
My empirical results indicate that several reforms that restrict
the scope of products liability have a significant impact on economic
activity. Statutes of repose that limit the period for which
manufacturers and product sellers are liable for product defects are
associated with statistically significant increases in both the number
of small businesses and the amount of employment in manufacturing
industries. They are also weakly associated with the number of
businesses and employment in the industries that bear most of the
products liability claims: the manufacturing, retail, distribution,
wholesale, and insurance industries.
Similarly, comparative negligence reforms that reduce damage
awards when plaintiffs engage in negligent activity affect economic
activity. These reforms are associated with statistically significant
increases in the number of small manufacturing businesses and
manufacturing production. Moreover, they are weakly associated with
increases in production in industries bearing most of the products
liability claims.
As expected, reforms that eliminate strict liability for
nonmanufacturer product sellers increase the economic activity for
only the broader category of industries that includes nonmanufacturer
product sellers. Whereas these reforms have no relationship with
economic activity in manufacturing industries, they are associated
with increases in businesses, employment, and production in the
aggregate category of industries that includes retailers, distributors,
and wholesalers.
Other reforms have a weaker and less consistent relationship
with economic activity. Reforms to the collateral source rule are
associated with increases in the number of businesses and level of
production in both manufacturing industries and the larger category
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of high-risk industries that includes the retail, distribution, wholesale,
and insurance industries. Noneconomic damage caps are positively
associated with the number of small businesses in both definitions of
high-risk industries.
In contrast, reforms to joint and several liability are associated
with decreases in the number of businesses and level of production in
both manufacturing industries and the larger category of high-risk
industries that includes the retail, distribution, wholesale, and
insurance industries. Similarly, punitive damage caps are associated
with decreases in the amount of employment in both definitions of
high-risk industries. However, the results are not statistically
significant across all specifications, casting doubt on the reliability of
the findings.
E. Implicationsfor Recent Reforms
My empirical results have important implications for recently
enacted reforms and proposed legislation. They indicate that some
products liability reforms will improve economic conditions as
lawmakers hope, but others will have no discernible effect on economic
activity.
My evidence suggests that statutes of repose, reforms that
eliminate strict liability for product sellers, and reforms adopting
comparative fault significantly increase many measures of economic
activity. Noneconomic damage caps and reforms to the collateral
source rule weakly improve economic conditions. In contrast, punitive
damage caps and reforms eliminating joint and several liability have a
negative impact on certain measures of economic activity.
Thus, the results of my empirical analysis suggest that several
recently enacted reforms should improve economic conditions. For
example, Alabama's Small Business Protection Act of 2011 that
eliminates strict liability for nonmanufacturer product sellers should
increase economic activity among retailers, distributors, and
wholesalers in the state.212 Similarly, Tennessee should experience
increases in economic activity after enacting reforms in 2011 that
prohibit products liability claims against retailers that were not
involved in the manufacturing, design, or packaging of a product. 213

212. See S.B. 184, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-501, -521
(2012)).
213. 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 510, § 11 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (West
2012).
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Also in 2011, Oklahoma 214 and Tennessee 215 enacted new caps on
noneconomic damages. My results suggest that these reforms may
lead to slight increases in certain measures of economic activity.
In contrast, other recent reforms are unlikely to improve
economic conditions, and may even worsen certain measures of
economic activity. For example, South Carolina, 216 Tennessee, 217 and
Wisconsin 218 adopted punitive damage caps in 2011, while Florida,219
Oklahoma, 220 and Pennsylvania 221 eliminated joint and several
liability in the recovery of all damages.
Although no state has enacted a new statute of repose since
Ohio in 2004,222 twenty-seven states currently have these reforms.
Moreover, recently proposed federal legislation calls for a federal
statute of repose. The Workplace Goods Job Growth and
Competitiveness Act of 2006 proposed a federal twelve-year statute of
repose for all durable goods. 223 If enacted, the Act would have
prevented recovery in all cases where an injury occurred more than
twelve years after the good was first marketed in the United States.
My empirical results suggest that the proponents' assertions that the
bill would promote "job growth and competitiveness" were accurate; a
federal statute of repose would likely increase jobs and improve
economic conditions.
Another recently proposed federal tort reform bill called for
reform of products liability claims against small businesses. The bill
proposed caps on punitive damages, the elimination of joint and
several liability rules, and the rejection of strict liability for

214. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 61.2 (West 2011) (limiting bodily injury noneconomic loss
compensation to three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000) where the jury does not find
defendant's conduct was grossly negligent, with reckless disregard for others, fraudulent, or
intentional).
215. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102(a)(2) (2011) (limiting noneconomic damages to seven
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) for all injuries or occurrences asserted).
216. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-530 (2011) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of three
times the compensatory damages award or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)).
217. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 (capping punitive damages at five hundred thousand
dollars ($500,000) with certain exceptions).
218. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.043 (West 2011) (limiting punitive damages to twice the amount
of compensatory damages or two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), whichever is greater).
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2012).
220. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 15 (West 2011).
221. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 2011).
222. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (LexisNexis 2004) (imposing two-year statute of
limitations on products liability claims).
223. H.R. 3509, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006).
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nonmanufacturer product sellers. 224 The sponsors of the bill argued
that the current products liability system "impedes competitiveness in
the marketplace for goods, services, business, and employees" whereas
the proposed reforms would "promote the free flow of goods and
services [and] lessen burdens on interstate commerce."225 My
empirical results support their claims about the elimination of strict
liability for product sellers; these reforms should increase economic
activity. However, my results indicate that punitive damage caps and
reforms to joint and several liability and are unlikely to improve
economic conditions.
CONCLUSION

Developments over the last few decades, such as increases in
the availability of insurance, consumers' access to product
information, governmental safety regulations, and litigation costs,
have altered the relative magnitudes of products liability law's costs
and benefits, forcing courts and legislatures to reassess the
appropriate scope of products liability law. Although claims about the
impact of products liability law on economic activity have been at the
forefront of this policy debate, these claims have largely gone
empirically untested. This study fills that void by providing the first
empirical evidence of the impact of products liability reforms on
important measures of economic activity: businesses, employment,
and production.
My results indicate that many reforms do ignite economic
activity as the reformers suggest. However, many other reforms have
no discernible effect on economic conditions. Statutes of repose that
limit the time period for which manufacturers are liable for product
defects, comparative negligence reforms that reduce damage awards
when plaintiffs engage in negligent activity, and reforms that
eliminate strict liability for nonmanufacturer product sellers are all
associated with statistically significant increases in economic activity.
Specifically, my results suggest that these reforms increase the
number of businesses, employment, and production in the industries
that bear most of the products liability claims: the manufacturing,
retail, distribution, wholesale, and insurance industries.
In contrast, other reforms have a weak effect on economic
activity. My results suggest that caps on noneconomic damages and
224. Small Business Liability Reform Act, H.R 2813, 108th Cong. (2003).
225. Id.
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reforms to the traditional collateral source rule are only weakly
associated with increases in economic activity. Meanwhile, caps on
punitive damages and reforms eliminating joint and several liability
are weakly associated with decreases in certain measures of economic
activity.
In the current economy, lawmakers are increasingly looking to
legislation to ignite business activity and improve economic
conditions. The results of this study indicate that some products
liability reforms will improve economic conditions as lawmakers hope,
whereas others will have no discernible effect on economic activity.
Understanding the likely impacts will help to ensure that reforms are
shaped less by myth and power politics, and more by information
about their true impacts.
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APPENDIX 1

Table Al reports the industry groups defined as high-risk
industries in this analysis.
TABLE Al: DEFINITIONS OF HIGH-RISK INDUSTRIES

Manufacturing Industries (SIC
code)
Food and kindred products (2000)
Tobacco manufacturers (2100)
Textile mill products (2200)
Apparel and other textile products
(2300)

Lumber and wood products (2400)
Furniture and fixtures (2500)
Paper and allied products (2600)
Printing and publishing (2700)
Chemicals and allied products
(2800)
Petroleum and coal products
(2900)
Rubber and plastic products (3000)
Leather products (3100)
Stone, glass, and concrete products
(3200)
Primary metal industries (3300)
Fabricated metal products (3400)
Industrial machinery and
equipment (3500)
Electrical and electronic
equipment (3600)
Transportation equipment (3700)
Instruments and related products
(3800)
Miscellaneous manufacturing
industries (3900)

,

Industries Bearing Most of the
Products Liability Claims (SIC code)
Manufacturing industries (20003900)
Wholesale trade-durable goods
(5000)
Wholesale trade-nondurable goods
(5100)
Building materials, hardware, garden
supply (5200)
General merchandise stores (5300)
Food stores (5400)
Automotive dealers and gasoline
stations (5500)
Apparel and accessory stores (5600)
Furniture & home equipment stores
(5700)

Eating and drinking places (5800)
Miscellaneous retail (5900)
Insurance carriers (6300)
Insurance agents, brokers, and service
(6400)
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APPENDIX 2
Table A2 reports the industry groups defined as low-risk
industries in this analysis.
TABLE A2: DEFINITIONS OF Low-RISK INDUSTRIES
Low-Risk Control Industries (SIC code)
Fishing, hunting, trapping (900)
Metal mining (1000)
Coal mining (1200)
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
(1400)
Water transportation (4400)
Pipelines, except natural gas (4600)
Communications (4800)
Electric, gas, and sanitary services (4900)
Personal services (7200)
Business services (7300)
Automotive repair, services, and parking
(7500)
Motion pictures (7800)
Educational services (8200)
Social services (8300)
Museums, galleries, botanical &
zoological gardens (8400)
Membership organizations (8600)

In order for the low-risk industries to serve as adequate controls,
the measures of economic activity in the low-risk industries must be
mostly unaffected by products liability reforms. This assumption
would be violated if, for example, insurers pool liability risk across
different industries or if the low-risk industries frequently face
liability for the types of claims covered by products liability reforms.
However, both of these possibilities are extremely unlikely. Moreover,
if this assumption is violated, the estimates of the impact of the
products liability reforms on economic activity in the high-risk
industries will be biased toward zero. Thus, my results would only
understate the true impact of products liability law on economic
activity.
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In addition, to mitigate endogeneity concerns, economic activity
in low-risk industries must be highly correlated with economic activity
in high-risk industries. This condition would hold if state-specific
factors such as a powerful probusiness lobby, tax incentives, low
wages, and a large supply of skilled workers are important to the
economic activity of businesses in both low-risk and high-risk
industries. In Table A3, I provide evidence that the economic activity
measures of businesses in low-risk industries are a good predictor of
the economic activity measures of businesses in high-risk industries.
The number of small business establishments in low-risk industries is
positively related to the number of small business establishments in
high-risk industries. The table also shows that employment and gross
state product in low-risk industries are positive predictors of those
same measures in high-risk industries. In each case, with robust or
state-clustered standard errors, the effects are highly statistically
significant. Moreover, the R2s in each specification are large,
indicating that the low-risk measures explain a large portion of the
variation in the high-risk measures.
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TABLE A3:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Low-RISK CONTROL INDUSTRIES AND HIGH-RISK
INDUSTRIES 2 26
Manufacturing Industry

Industries Bearing Most of the Products
Liability Claims

In(small
business
establishmen
ts per
100,000)
In(relevan
t low-risk
control)

0.307
(0.064)*
[0.111]*

In(employm
ent in small
business
establishmen
ts per
100,000)
0.148
(0.045)*
[0.062]*

Adjusted
R2

0.8968

0.9208

ln(real per
capita
gross state
product

In(small
business
establishmen
ts per
100,000)

In(real per
capita gross
state product

0.499
(0.077)*
[0.151]*

In(employme
nt in small
business
establishment
s per
100,000)
0.295
(0.056)*
[0.065]*

0.023
(0.0 11)*
[0.009]*

0.9863

0.9096

0.9091

0.9917

0.040
(0.02)*
[0.015]*

226. The dependent variable is designated in the second row. It is one of three activity-level
measures: the natural log of the number of small business establishments in the high-risk
industries per one hundred thousand state residents, the natural log of the number of employees
in small business establishments in the high-risk industries per one hundred thousand state
residents, or the natural log of the real per capita gross state product in the high-risk industries.
The definition of high-risk industries is designated in the first row, it is either the manufacturing
industry or industries bearing most of the products liability claims: manufacturing, retail,
distribution, wholesale, and insurance. The following industries served as low-risk controls:
mining, water transportation, pipelines, communications, utilities, personal services, business
services, auto repair services, miscellaneous repair services, motion pictures, educational
services, social services, museums, and membership organizations. Below the coefficients, robust
standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets.
All regressions are estimated with state population weights and include state and year dummies.
All estimations have 1071 observations.
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